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1 Introduction
T HIS thesis is composed of three essays on socio-economic determinants of riskysexual behavior and HIV/AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa. Sub-Saharan Africa
accounts for 70% of new HIV infections, being the most severely devastated continent
by the epidemics by hosting 68% of approximately 34 million people living with
HIV/AIDS worldwide.1
Many studies have documented the long-term consequences of HIV/AIDS: a big drop
in life expectancy;2 death of adults during reproductive age and vulnerable orphans
(Case et al., 2004); displacement of firms due to morbidity and absenteeism of work-
ers; death of adults in their productive age who leave members of their family in eco-
nomic crisis (Whiteside 2002) and many more implications. Fortunately, AIDS treat-
ment is increasingly accessible for a larger proportion of the population. However,
on average, only one third of HIV infected individuals who are eligible for treatment
have access to anti-retroviral therapy (ART).
There is a general consensus that the primary channel of HIV/AIDS transmission in
Africa is heterosexual sex (Schmid et al., 2004). Indeed, the DHS Comparative Report
(February 2009) shows that HIV infection is associated with an increasing number of
lifetime sex-partners, earlier age of sexual debut among women, sex with non-marital
or non-cohabiting partners and alcohol use during last sex. By now, there is also a
growing body of research focusing on socio-economic determinants of risky sexual
behavior and hence HIV/AIDS in Africa. Among the many characteristics outlined
are: poverty, migration, cost of HIV testing, circumcision, sugar daddies and political
instability. (Decosas et al., 1995, Dupas 2011, Dupas et al., 2011, Dupas et al., 2010
, Thornton 2008 , Gray et al., 2007, Whitside 2002[120]).
This research contributes to the framework of the above literature by highlighting
community or individual level characteristics that shape risky sexual behavior. The
approach is based on the discussion and provision of literature reviews on mecha-
nisms that drive changes in risky behavior. These diverse mechanisms are supported
with empirical analysis from two sources of data: the Demographic and Health Sur-
vey and firsthand data collected in Cameroon. The thesis starts by looking at how
community level characteristics like ethno-linguistic heterogeneity shape individuals’
risky sexual behavior. It puts in evidence a peculiar aspect of African societies charac-
1 UNAIDS World AIDS day report, 2011
2 2009 AIDS Epidemic Update stated that life expectancy has dropped on average to 45 in countries
most affected by HIV.
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terized by ethno-linguistic diversity. I argue, in line with the literature, different forms
of heterogeneity reduce social networks and information on deviating behaviors like
extramarital sex; such environments are favorable specifically for women who want
to engage in risky sexual behavior. The second essay looks at pregnancy response
of women when treatment initiating by using firsthand data from Cameroon. Cer-
tain societies value high number of children as they represent richness. This might
induce individuals to engage in risky sexual behavior intentionally for reproductive
reasons and avoid different forms of stigma. Finally, I look at family structure and
sex composition of siblings. In African contest, where sex and age-based hierarchy
among siblings is widespread, the study investigates how preceding sex composition
of siblings affects teen pregnancy. The idea behind is gender and age create different
forms of authority among members of the family which result in monitoring behav-
iors among younger teen girls. In the following paragraphs, an abstract of each essay,
single authored, is outlined for illustrative and briefing purpose.
1.1 HIV, Risky Sexual Behavior and Ethno-Linguistic
Heterogeneity
Ethno-linguistic heterogeneity is associated with indicators of development like civil
society, trust, quality of institutions, economic performance and participation. Re-
cently, it has been found to be favorable for optimizing agents who want to engage in
risky sexual behavior as they can select partners outside their own network and that
of their spouse (Pongou 2011). This paper augments the literature by arguing that the
effect of ethno-linguistic heterogeneity on risky sexual behavior is gender related. In
contexts where women have more economic benefits (or losses) from sexual partners
and their extramarital sexual relations are highly stigmatized, they better take advan-
tage from the reduced likelihood of detection. With respect to men, ethno-linguistic
heterogeneity significantly affects women’s HIV status and their risky sexual behav-
ior. Accordingly, it affects positively the probability of being in a discordant couple
where the wife is HIV positive. The analysis is based on empirical evidence from the
DHS surveys in Sub-Saharan Countries.
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1.2 Pregnancy Response when Scaling-Up Anti-Retroviral
Therapy
The HIV/AIDS epidemic has dramatically altered patterns of morbidity and mortality
with different consequences on fertility behavior. The study takes advantage of a
unique data-set collected in Cameroon among HIV positive patients and estimates the
relationship between HAART treatment and (intended) pregnancy. The direct health
benefits of treatment imply rational and behavioral response in pregnancy as it allows
individuals to accomplish their desired number of children. A before-after analysis
is conducted to evaluate the effect of the 2007 policy based on scaling-up HAART
treatment at national level. With respect to women not yet on treatment, HAART
increased the propensity to pregnancy after one year with the coefficient increasing
over time after 2007. Pregnancy response was highest among people who have lower
number of children pre-treatment and with CD4 counts above the average at treatment
initiation. The study discusses and tests different mechanisms that drive the behavioral
response in Yaounde-Cameroon.
1.3 Siblings Sex Composition and Risky Sexual Behavior
Sex and birth order of siblings are found to be important determinants of economic
outcomes and future well-being. This study augments the literature by examining how
gender of the firstborn matters in shaping risky sexual behavior of the younger ones
in Central Africa. Based on the DHS survey, it shows that male firstborns, who enjoy
authority due to pro-male biased society, better shape risky sexual behavior of younger
teen sisters as compared to female firstborns. This mechanism holds for any preceding
male where age-based hierarchy interacted with gender creates positive externality
for the household by reducing the associated cost of premarital teen pregnancy. The
study puts in evidence the mechanisms and illustrates the welfare consequences of
premarital teen pregnancy.
1.4 Thesis Organization
The structure of the thesis is as follows:
Chapter 2 presents the research on HIV, Ethno-linguistic Heterogeneity and Risky
Sexual Behavior. The section is composed of an overview, theoretical motivation,
data and methodology. Finally, main conclusions are discussed in the last section.
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Chapter 3 outlines the paper on Pregnancy Response of Women Living with HIV/AIDS
with Scaling-up of HAART Treatment based on data collected in Cameroon. The
section gives an overview of the existing literature, the empirical strategy used with
description of the data, treats to internal validity and finally conclusions that can be
drown from data analysis.
Chapter 4 , on Gender of Older Siblings and Teen-Pregnancy, presents some insights
on the role of hierarchy and gender among siblings in Central Africa. It starts by
illustrating the role of teen pregnancy, the associated costs and how parents coop with
it. The section describes the data and identification strategy and conclusive remarks.
Welfare consequences of teen pregnancy are also discussed.
9
2 HIV, Risky Sexual Behavior and Ethno-Linguistic
Heterogeneity
Nowadays, risky sexual behavior is a major focus of HIV prevention policy in Africa.
Understanding the behavioral response in the region is an important base for pre-
dicting the future path of the epidemic. Studies in Africa have shown that general
response in risky sexual behavior due to the epidemics is ambiguous (Stoneburner
and Low-Beer, 2004; Bloom et al., 2000; Williams et al., 2003). It is found to be
heterogeneous based on socio-economic characteristics like education of women (De
Walque, 2007; Dupas, 2009), future life expectancies and expected revenues (Oster,
2012). The anti-HIV education labeled ABC-Abstain, Be faithful and use Condom-
has proven to be effective in Uganda (Green et al, 2006) and it has been extended to
other sub-Saharan countries without, up to now, any clear evidence of success.3
Other than behavioral factors at the individual level, treatment of non-HIV sexually
transmitted diseases, including circumcision of men, has proven to be effective in
preventing HIV/AIDS (Weiss et al., 2000) and shaping its regional pattern.4 Also,
local economic development plays a role on HIV infection through transactional sex,
as emphasized in Oster (2007). Under the assumption that risky sexual behavior is
a normal good, economic development, induced by exports, affects individuals’ HIV
status.
In contrast to large number of studies examining individual-level features and deter-
minants of infection, few studies have focused on community level characteristics
and networks that affect individual’s sexual behavior. This research contributes in
analyzing the diverse rates of HIV prevalence across regions and gives insights in
understanding the role ethno-linguistic heterogeneity has on risky sexual behavior.
Heterogeneity in terms of ethnicity, race or religion has important implications on so-
cial capital and, consequently, on economic variables.5 Such communities give little
space for informal social networks, making the flow of information on individual’s
deviating behaviors less likely to be detected. It is also associated with lower trust
3 However, Oster (2007) gives alternative possible reasons why ABC was claimed to be effective
in Uganda. She explains that routes of exports have an important role rather than population based
educational campaign.
4 The high rate of HIV transmission in Africa is due to other untreated sexually transmitted diseases
(STD). The difference in transmission rates is large enough to explain the observed difference in preva-
lence between the United States and Sub-Saharan Africa (Oster 2005).
5 For example, Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) found that ethnic, racial and economic heterogeneity
have a negative impact on social capital and consequently on economic development in the USA.
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among communities because members of the community have different tastes mak-
ing it difficult to enforce a system of social sanctions and cohesion. Such types of
communities leave less-or-unsanctioned socially deviating behaviors.
Pongou (2011) is the first paper to show that individuals living in heterogeneous soci-
eties are more likely to engage in extramarital sex because they can easily avoid being
detected by their partner. The paper developed a theory to explain how community-
level ethnic heterogeneity determines the formation of sexual networks among cou-
ples, and how this, in turn, affects the spread of HIV/AIDS. In the model, agents
derive utility from sexual relationships and infidelity is punished if detected by own
partner. When information circulates more easily within ethnic groups than across,
agents tend to choose their extramarital partners from different groups to hide their
infidelity, thanks to cross-group anonymity.
This chapter extends the findings of Pongou (2011) by underlining the role of gender-
gap in extramarital sex. In many communities cost of detection from extramarital sex
is higher for women for two reasons. Firstly, gender specific roles in sexuality require
only men to be risk takers with multiple partners, defined as masculinity.6 Further-
more, in a gender biased economy where individuals gain non-material and material
benefits from engaging in extramarital sex, the cost of being sanctioned from detection
is augmented for women by the material loss incurred from their partner. Thus women
internalize better community characteristics and ethno-linguistic heterogeneity when
optimizing the number of extramarital sex. With respect to Pongou (2011), this study
highlights a particular aspect of several African societies: pro-male economy and pa-
triarchal tradition. Both characteristics make women’s adultery highly stigmatized
and costly. I argue that ethno-linguistic heterogeneity shapes more women’s behavior
rather than men’s by giving evidence of higher elasticity for women. The extension is
further supported by the analysis conducted on couples’ data-set and concordance of
their HIV status.
I use the Demographic and Health Survey data-sets (DHS) to link HIV status of in-
dividuals with their ethnic characteristic. The study is focused on four sub-Saharan
countries: Malawi, Cameroon, Kenya and Ethiopia in order of HIV prevalence. The
choice of these countries is driven by data availability on ethnicity, territorial compa-
rability and relevant HIV prevalence.7 The period of survey ranges between 2003 and
6 Men tend to have/declare more extramarital sex then women. For a literature review on gender
differences in sexuality refer to Oliver et al. (1993).
7 With respect to Pongou (2011) I exclude Burkina Faso and Ghana for territorial comparability. HIV
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2005.
The variable of interest is computed with three different measures of heterogene-
ity widely used in the literature: the Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization (ELF) in-
dex, based on the Herfindahl index; Generalized Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization
(GELF), an extension of the ELF which takes into account similarity between ethnic
groups based on cross-ethnic marriages; the Entropy index (EI) which is an indica-
tor of diversity. The three measures differ for the degree of interaction among ethnic
groups as well as the number of ethnicities in the community. The ELF gives more
weight to individuals with higher proportion in the population. The GELF takes into
account some aspects of similarity between the groups. The Entropy index, on the
contrary, gives more weight to the number of ethnicities in the community.
Results suggest ethno-linguistic heterogeneity is more elastic to HIV status of women
rather than men. This finding is not driven by the biological exposure of women to
HIV infection. Notwithstanding, I further analyze the data-set of couples and their
HIV status by focusing on discordant couples who are married for more than 5 years.
I find a positive relationship between the indicators and the probability of being in a
discordant couple where she is positive and the husband is negative. On the reverse,
I do not find the same relationship on discordant couples where he is positive. This
finding suggests women are more sensitive to social environment when engaging in
risky sexual behavior.
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.1 gives an outline of the mechanism
that drive risky behavior; 2.2 illustrates the identification strategy and results. Sensi-
tivity analysis is conducted in Section 2.4 and finally, some conclusions are laid off in
Section 2.5.
2.1 Conceptual Framework
Ethnic fractionalization has an important role in the political economy of many coun-
tries as it leads to political instability, poor quality of institutions, badly designed
economic policy and poor economic performance. Several studies have shown the
negative relationship between racial or ethnic heterogeneity and the provision of pub-
lic goods (Alesina et al., 1999; Miguel and Gugerty, 2005a) while others focused on
prevalence is very low in these two countries.
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its impact on productivity (Bandiera et al., 2005; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005). For
example, a comparison across US counties showed that higher ethnic fractionalization
is associated with a lower rate of collective action in the community (Vigdor, 2004).
There are also studies that have linked ethnic fractionalization with lower trust and
participation in the communities (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000).
The role of ethno-linguistic heterogeneity on low public expenditures and provision
of public goods has an implication on HIV/AIDS. Indeed, in fragmented societies,
governments are less likely to provide anti-HIV policies because of lower civil society
and collective action (Lieberman, 2007).
Measuring, and thus defining, ethno-linguistic heterogeneity in sub-Saharan countries
has been challenging. The traditional measure based on the Herfindahl index, conven-
tionally called Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization (ELF), is given by the probability
of two randomly drawn individuals from a given population belong to two different
groups. If I consider a community composed of more than two different ethnic groups,
with si being the share of group i over the total at community level and n being the
total number of ethnicity, then the ELF index would be:
ELF = 1−
n
∑
i=1
s2i (1)
It varies between 0-1 and an increase in the indicator means more heterogeneous so-
ciety. The ELF assumes that language and ethnicity map one-to-one and both have
similar consequences on individuals’ networking and social sanctions.
Social heterogeneity is endogenous to many unobservables at community level. It is
a continuously evolving indicator and difficult to define across different cultural, time
and space boundaries. For example, continuous regional migration and inter-mixing
with other groups suggests it is a function of local economic development, colonial
policy and inter-group mixing (Alesina et al., 2003). More detailed critics to indicators
of ethno-linguistic heterogeneity in Africa have been argued in Posner (2004).
In some societies there are different similarities among different ethnic groups which
compose the community. The ELF index gives the same weight to all ethnicity, while
in reality some might have similar cultural values which should be taken into account.
The ELF index attributes a 0 or 1 value to individuals in the community depending
if they belong or not to an ethnicity or race. A generalized version of ELF (General-
ized Index of Ethno-linguistic Hetergeneity-GELF) has been proposed in Bossert et
al. (2008) where each individual is weighted by similarity values. Similarity measure-
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ment can be based on income, education, language and etc. To compute the indicator
of similarity, I use the matching of ethnicities from the data-set of couples. The reason-
ing behind is if a high proportion of people from ethnicity «x» get married to another
ethnicity «y» then similarity between these two ethnicities is non zero in terms of cul-
tural values and networks. To compute similarities between two ethnicities, I take the
average of four frequencies: frequency of wife from ethnicity «x» getting married to
husband from ethnicity «y»; frequency of wife from ethnicity «y» getting married to
husband from ethnicity «x»; and similarly for the husband. To give you some illus-
tration on the indicator I construct, let us consider a community with three ethnicities.
The similarity matrix, S, of couples’ matching based on the ethnicity of the husband
and wife is as follows:
S =
 1 sx,y sx,zsy,x 1 sy,z
sz,x sz,y 1
 (2)
where sx,y = sy,x = avg
[
f hy,x, f
h
x,y , f
w
y,x , f
w
x,y
]
and f hx,y denotes the proportion of husbands
«x» getting married to women of «y» (script h stands for husband while w for wife).
The matrix is symmetric and equal to 1 on the diagonals as similarity with own eth-
nicity is 1. I construct a similarity matrix as above for each enumeration area in the
data-set. Based on the above matrix, S, the Generalized Ethno-Linguistic Fractional-
ization (GELF) indicator, as proposed in Bossart et al (2008), is as follows:
GELF = 1− 1
n2
n
∑
i=1
n
∑
j=1
si, j (3)
where i, j ε {x ,y ,z} and si, j is an element of the matrix S.
It is important to note that GELF is particularly dependent on the variable(s) of asso-
ciation or similarity used to compute the matrix. In this paper, the similarity is based
on cross-ethnic marriage which is computed from the couples data-set and does not
necessarily reflect the overall heterogeneity within the community.
Another index of diversity computed is the Entropy Index (EI), also known as the
Shannon Index, used for species to measure biodiversity. The ELF index gives bigger
weight to higher proportion of ethnicities as it has a quadratic form while the EI gives
a decreasing weight as the proportion of a specific ethnicity increases in a commu-
nity. It takes a maximum value when all the ethnicities are equally represented in the
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community. I compute a normalized EI, between [0,1], in each enumeration area:
EI =
−∑nj=1 siln(si)−
[
(n−1)
2N
]
ln(n)
(4)
where si is the proportion of ethnic i in the community, n is the number of ethnicities
in the community and N is the total number of individuals in the community.
The above indicators are computed on ethnicities in each enumeration area by exploit-
ing data at the individual level. There are a total of 50 ethnicities in Cameroon, 67 in
Ethiopia, 15 in Kenya and 9 in Malawi. The correlation between the three indica-
tors I computed is 0.79 between ELF and GELF, 0.94 between ELF and EI and 0.75
between GELF and EI.
2.2 Empirical Strategy and Results
I use the most recent waves of DHS household surveys: Cameroon 2004, Ethiopia
2005, Kenya 2003 and Malawi 2004. They include both ethnicity and AIDS Indicator
Survey (AIS). Due to spatial correlation on HIV prevalence these countries are broadly
comparable. Summary statistics are provided in Table 1.
The DHS surveys collect information on population, health, HIV, and nutrition every
five years in different countries. Together with the questionnaire, individuals are asked
to give a blood spot for HIV test and the outcome is not communicated to the intervie-
wees. In case individuals are interested, they are given a voucher for HIV test that can
be consumed in the nearest hospital. The percentage of individuals who know their
status before the DHS survey is very low. As such, DHS gives several advantages: it
provides the most accurate estimate of HIV prevalence in the population; individuals
are not aware of their status allowing for research on the determinants of HIV; indi-
viduals’ HIV status is linked to their socio-economic characteristics and that of their
partner.
15
Tab. 1: Descriptive Statistics
!"#
$%&'()*'+,
-.% $/0 1$/0 $234567 $89:*;<= 6<<'.>& 6<<'.' ?@88A. 4@:B.' 4@:B.>& ?@C'*=&
D*).'<<=
!"#
!$"# %&%' %&(' ''&)* '+&,( -.&-( *&(( %&+- %&+) %&+( %&.* %&./ %&''
01 %&+( .&%( .)&() .(&/% .)&*( +&(( %&*- %&*) %&*( %&'. %&'' %&-%
234 -%'' -%*/ -%'' '(+, '(+, '-+) -%'' -%'' -%'' -%'' -%'' '(+,
567"#
!$"# %&%, %&.( '.&.% '%&.) -%&.+ '&%+ %&+) %&+) %&+( %&.+ %&.* %&''
01 %&.- %&)- .(&'/ .(&(. .(&%, +&(' %&*( %&*) %&'% %&'+ %&'. %&-%
234 -+-- -+*, -+-- -%'+ -%'+ '+*% -+-- -+-- -+-- -+-- -+-- -%'+
869":
!$"# %&%- %&/+ '*&-% '+&%* -+&*) '&%% %&+, %&+) %&+( %&.. %&.- %&''
01 %&.. +&/. .(&.- .(&,, .)&,/ +&(, %&*, %&*) %&'% %&'+ %&'* %&-%
234 +%+(( +%+,* +%+(( ((-) ((-) )/') +%+(( +%+(( +%+(( +%+(( +%+(( ((-)
$&B@<E@*
!"#
!$"# %&%+ %&%- +*&*, .%&%, *%&*( *&*) %&+) %&.% %&+) %&.% %&.' %&+'
01 %&%( %&./ .%&/( .'&)/ *.&-% +&,) %&*( %&'% %&*) %&'% %&'* %&*'
234 -+%) /%./ /%** -()% -()% *-(( /%** /%** /%** /%** /%** -()%
567"#
!$"# %&%. %&%. +'&%+ .%&%. *+&', *&+- %&+( %&.% %&+( %&+) %&.- %&.+
01 %&+* %&.. .+&'/ .'&)+ *.&)/ +&,, %&*( %&'% %&*( %&*( %&'* %&'+
234 -('. /,(* /)+. /,-% /,-% .,*' /)+. /)+. /)+. /)+. /)+. /,-%
869":
!$"# %&%+ %&%' +*&,+ .%&%' *%&(/ *&.( %&+) %&.% %&+) %&+( %&.- %&+)
01 %&++ %&.' .+&+% .'&)* *.&,% +&,) %&*( %&'% %&*( %&*( %&'* %&*)
234 ++%-% +.)+( +.)'- +.,*% +.,*% /*** +.)'- +.)'- +.)'- +.)'- +.)'- +.,*%
F.=G*
!"#
!$"# %&%- %&*( .+&+* .%&%+ *%&() -&%* %&+- %&+, %&+) %&.. %&., %&*/
01 %&.+ %&(- ./&** ./&/- *.&'- .&*( %&*/ %&*) %&*( %&'. %&'- %&')
234 .(+, *-,* *-,) *')% *')% *.,) *-,) *-,) *-,) *-,) *-,) *')%
567"#
!$"# %&%( %&+* .%&,' .%&/- *+&+% -&., %&+- %&+) %&+( %&.+ %&./ %&'(
01 %&.) %&*, ./&.% ./&). *.&'- .&*, %&*/ %&*) %&*( %&'+ %&'' %&-%
234 *.,* '%*% '%'* *(-- *(-- *'%/ '%'* '%'* '%'* '%'* '%'* *(--
869":
!$"# %&%, %&.- .%&(. .%&*- *+&%' -&+- %&+- %&+) %&+) %&.. %&., %&'*
01 %&.- %&,. ./&./ ./&,' *.&'- .&*( %&*/ %&*) %&*( %&'+ %&'' %&-%
234 /+(% ,/%* ,/.+ ,'*- ,'*- //)' ,/.+ ,/.+ ,/.+ ,/.+ ,/.+ ,'*-
?*A*H@
!"#
!$"# %&+% %&.- */&(/ */&)% -*&%) '&') %&+* %&.% %&.* %&.* %&.+ %&'.
01 %&*% %&), ./&** .-&', .)&/% .&.( %&** %&'% %&'. %&'. %&'+ %&'(
234 .'%' .'%+ .'%' .*,- .*,- .+-% .'%' .'%' .'%' .'%' .'%' .*,-
567"#
!$"# %&+' %&%, *-&(* *-&-/ -.&)/ '&') %&+, %&.+ %&.. %&.. %&+( %&''
01 %&*- %&., .-&/( .-&-- .)&'* .&*% %&*) %&'% %&'+ %&'+ %&*( %&-%
234 .)/' .)/' .)/' .).) .).) .+(% .)/' .)/' .)/' .)/' .)/' .).)
869":
!$"# %&+. %&+- */&'% */&+* -.&(/ '&') %&+- %&.% %&.* %&.. %&.% %&'*
01 %&** %&/* .-&(( .-&-. .)&-% .&*% %&*/ %&'% %&'. %&'. %&'% %&-%
234 -./) -./- -./) -.%* -.%* '*'% -./) -./) -./) -./) -./) -.%*
Both HIV status and extramarital sex (including premarital sex) vary across regions
and countries. Men declare more extramarital sex than women but they are less likely
to be HIV positive with respect to women. Cameroon is the most heterogeneous
country in terms of ethnicity followed by Malawi, Kenya and Ethiopia. For ease of
interpretation, all indicators of heterogeneity are used in percentage forms throughout
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the paper. In terms of socio-economic characteristics, these countries are comparable
except for education in Kenya, which is the highest. Further descriptive statistics can
be found in Table 1.
Research on risky sexual behavior, or number of sexual partners, based on self-reported
information suffers from under/over reporting. Their reliability depend on socio-
economic characteristics of the respondent, the way the questionnaire was adminis-
tered and last but not least quality of interviewers. Many studies have underlined
how self-reported variables on sexual behavior result inconsistent when information
is matched with biological features like sexually transmitted diseases (Gersovitz et al.,
1998; Glynn et al., 2001).8 For example, the number of extramarital sex, declared by
both married and cohabiting individuals is inconsistent with their recent sexual activ-
ity in the last four weeks. I use data from monogamous couples where information on
their sexual activity in the last four weeks and number of extramarital sex in the last
twelve months is available both for the husband and wife. There are a total of 7,698
couples interviewed. In 1,046 cases, the declaration of sexual activity is discordant,
i.e. husband declares to have been sexually active in the last four weeks while the
woman not. Indeed, in monogamous couples, if one partner declares not to be active
in the last four weeks while the other declares so, then the latter should declare at least
one extramarital sex in the last twelve months. Out of 513 cases, where the wife was
sexually active and the husband not, 99% of the women declared zero extramarital sex
in the last twelve months. Extramarital sex is under-reported for men as well: only
17.5% of them declare at least one extramarital sex, even if they have been active in
the last four weeks while their wife not. It is interesting to note that the discordance
in recent sexual activity is, approximately, equally distributed among men and women
(533 versus 513). This means that they were either negligent in reporting recent sexual
activity leading to inconsistency or husband and wife under-report extramarital sex.
One should correct for under/over reporting of extramarital sex with good instruments
that predict reporting but not correlated with sexual behavior. It is however difficult
to find variables with reliable exclusion restriction on reported extramarital sex. For
this reason, I focus on the relationship between HIV prevalence and ethno-linguistic
heterogeneity as HIV epidemics in Africa is known to be driven by heterosexual rela-
tions. In fact, recent studies on the subject complement self-reported sexual behaviors
with other biomarkers of sexually transmitted diseases.
8 Glynn et al. (2001) showed that 12% of women who reported being virgins were HIV positive
and some had other sexually transmitted infections. This is labeled as “social desirability bias” where
individuals tend to bias responses based on what is expected from the society.
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The analysis of the chapter is conducted on HIV status of individuals, an objective
measurement of risky sexual behavior. It is conditional on the assumption that the
main channel of HIV transmission is heterosexual sex. In addition, exposure of men
and women to HIV infection per sexual act differs biologically. This study includes
controls for gender in the pooled analysis and in some cases I also conduct separate
regressions by gender. As robustness checks, I further support the findings on the
number of extramarital sex in the last 12 months.
The impact of Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization on HIV Status
HIV prevalence rate ranges between 1.3% in Ethiopia and 12.3% in Malawi.9 It is
higher among women (1.7% in Ethiopia and 13.9% in Malawi) rather than men and
in urban than in rural areas. I estimate the impact of ethnolinguistic heterogeneity on
HIV status of individuals based the following equation:
HIVi,c = α+βHc + γXi,c +δDr + εi,c (5)
where HIVi,c is HIV status of individual i in community c, Hc is ethno-linguistic or
religious heterogeneity in the community, Xi,c is a set of individual control variables
in community c and Dr is a set of dummies at regional level.
Location in urban/rural areas, education and wealth might be, to some extent, choice
variables for the individual or her family. Individuals migrate, due to their HIV status,
in more heterogeneous areas. For-example, ethno-linguistic heterogeneity might give
an opportunity to HIV positive individuals to keep confidentiality on their status and
use strategic behavior with their partner in order not to infect him. It might also
induce migration to seek medical care in cities which are likely to be heterogeneous.
Notwithstanding, it implies that she is aware of her status, which is often not the
case in the DHS. Hence, individuals are less likely to self-select in heterogeneous
societies due to their HIV status. Even though migration might not cause a problem
of reverse causality, it might bias the parameter of interest due to omitted variables.
Migration and commercial areas are among the main drivers of HIV prevalence and
at the same time they are likely to be in heterogeneous areas. I run the regressions on
a sample of communities with baseline density and 70% of the people sampled in the
community being residing for at least 10 years.10 The restricted sample is, hopefully,
9 All HIV prevalence rates in this paper are calculated by using the DHS sample weights
10 I restrict the sample to enumeration areas where at least 10 people have been sampled. This allows
a better interpretation of the indicators as they are less representative on small number of observations.
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representative of areas which are less subject to inflow of migration like commercial
areas. The restriction on the sample does not, however, rule out areas which are
subject to seasonal migration. Nonetheless this does not affect the main conclusion
of the paper.11 I further control for migration where I define migrant a person who
is residing in the place of residence for less than 10 years. The inclusion of regional
fixed effects reduces the coefficient on ethno-linguistic heterogeneity. This is due to
the fact that regional dummies capture ethnolinguistic heterogeneity at regional level.
When not controlled for, they have an upward bias on the parameter of interest because
positively correlated with ELF and HIV. Their inclusion implies that the coefficient on
ELF is capturing heterogeneity within regions.
For illustrative purpose and comparison with Pongou (2011), I report the effect of
ELF on HIV status and prevalence at enumeration area level in Table 2.12 A one
percent increase in ethno-linguistic heterogeneity increases the probability of being
HIV positive by almost 0.0003. In relative terms, this corresponds to 0.5% increase.
These coefficients are very similar to results found in Pongou (2011). Alternatively,
it increases HIV prevalence rate at enumeration area level by .0366 (58.6%). I report
results only on ELF for ease of comparison with Pongou (2011).
ELF is taken as a proxy for opportunities in networking (sexually) with individuals
from other ethnicities. I test this mechanism on a dummy that represents a minority
(or majority) ethnic group in a community. Minority (majority) dummy is more robust
compared to an indicator computed at enumeration area level and dependent on dif-
ferent factors like number of observation and algebraic properties of the formula. The
assumption behind is minority groups have more outside option than majority groups.
For ease of interpretation, I exclude areas where two or more ethnicities are both mi-
nority and majority groups at the same time. In Table3 I show minority groups are
likely to be HIV positive by 0.02 points while belonging to a majority group reduces
it by .01.
11 The DHS is a population based survey where randomly selected households are interviewed. As
household members of seasonal migrants are less likely to move with the individual, it is likely that they
do not affect the indicators of heterogeneity. These are often rural areas and likely to be homogenous.
Thus, the restriction of the sample to non-migrant individuals will imply a downward bias and does not
affect the main findings.
12 As in Pongou (2011), only OLS coefficients are reported.
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Tab. 2: Ethno-linguistic Heterogeneity on HIV status and HIV prevalence
OLS Regressions
HIV Status HIV Prevalence HIV Status HIV Prevalence
ELF 0.000544*** 0.0551*** 0.000316*** 0.0366***
(7.92e-05) (0.00749) (8.92e-05) (0.00788)
Religeous Fractionalization -8.66e-05 -0.0133
(0.000168) (0.0151)
ETHNIC FE YES YES YES YES
REGIONAL FE YES YES YES YES
URBAN YES YES
SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTROLS YES YES
Constant 0.0185 1.482 -0.0426 1.785
(0.0237) (1.218) (0.0298) (2.005)
Observations 30,139 34,070 30,139 34,070
R-squared 0.056 0.306 0.063 0.316
Dependent Variables
Standard errors are clustered at EA level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Dependent variables are HIV status and HIV prevalence calculated at the enumeration area level. All regres-
sions include regional dummies and ethnic fixed effects. Socio-economic controls include: wealth, education, religion
and age. Although results from OLS are shown results hold with non linear models. In all regressions, sample weights
are used and robust standard errors are clustered at the enumeration area level. Observations differ across the two
samples due to attrition on HIV status at the individual level while HIV prevalence is calculated at the enumeration
area (EA) level. In all regreassions sample weights are used and robust standard errors are clustered at enumeration
area level.
Tab. 3: Belonging to a Minority/Majority group on HIV status
OLS regressions
Belonging to the Majority Group -0.0169*** -0.00868
-0.00519 -0.00536
Belonging to the Minority Group 0.0211** 0.0206**
-0.00838 -0.00839
Socio-Economic Controls Yes Yes
Constant 0.129*** 0.0148 0.114*** 0.00177
-0.0374 -0.0409 -0.0368 -0.0403
Observations 22,248 22,248 22,248 22,248
R-squared 0.046 0.057 0.046 0.057
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent Variable: HIV Status
Note: The dependent variable is HIV status of individuals and Belonging to a Majority (Minority) Group is a variable
that takes the value 1 if the individual belongs to an ethnic group which is the most (least) sampled at the enumeration
area level. All communities where only one ethinicity cannot be identified as the majority (minority) are excluded
from the regression. Those are homogeneous areas as well as areas where all ethnicities are equally represented. The
set of control variables are wealth, education, religion, age, religious fractionalization, ethnicity and regional fixed
effects. In all regreassions sample weights are used and robust standard errors are clustered at enumeration area level.
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Table 4 reports OLS regressions by disentangling the effect of gender from ethno-
linguistic heterogeneity. Gender difference on the role of heterogeneity on HIV is
put in evidence in the table. All the indicators have a positive effect on HIV status
of women with broadly similar magnitudes. Indeed, I find a negative or no effect of
heterogeneity on HIV status of men.
The theoretical foundation of GELF imply it is the best measure of heterogeneity and
coherent with the theory of sexual networking. On the other side, GELF is computed
on the data-set of couples as similarity is measured in terms of cross ethnic marriages.
This implies all ethnicities of individuals not married or cohabitant are not included in
the computation. Still, they might represent an outside option for married individuals
who want to engage in risky behavior. In the regression, being a woman increases
the probability of being HIV positive by one percent on average in a completely ho-
mogeneous community. This effect is additionally increased by ethno-linguistic com-
position of the community by 0.6 percent. The coefficient on gender captures the
biological discrepancy of HIV infection between men and women. Results in Column
(1) of Table 4 are based on the ELF, while Column (2) reports the Generalized Index
and Column (3) shows the Entropy index. I further extend my analysis on the role of
women’s HIV status in married couples.
In Table 5, the analysis is based on sub-samples of women and men with their marital
status. In Column (1), I show results from the pooled sample; from Column (2) to
Column (7) the regressions are based on individuals who reside in enumeration areas
where the number of people sampled is superior to ten and the proportion of migrants
is less than 30 percent. This restriction reduces bias due to omitted variables caused by
commercial areas. The sample is further restricted by gender and marital status.13 An
interesting outcome of the table is the role of heterogeneity on HIV status of women
and specially married or cohabiting women at the time of the survey. An interpretation
of the parameters would suggest that HIV positive and married women are likely to
live in heterogeneous societies. Same interpretation cannot be extended to non married
or cohabiting women, as well as men independently from their marital status. In the
next section, I will focus on discordant couples where either she or he are HIV positive
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Tab. 4: The Effect of Ethno-linguistic Heterogeneity on HIV Status by Gender
    
Dependent Variable: HIV STATUS 
 OLS (1) (2) (3) 
     
ELF -0.000177*   
 (9.61e-05)   
GELF  -0.000128  
  (7.80e-05)  
EI   -0.0158** 
   (0.00682) 
(ELF/GELF/EI ) x  Female 0.000650*** 0.000440*** 0.0427*** 
 (0.000143) (0.000117) (0.00998) 
Female 0.00866*** 0.0109*** 0.00853*** 
 (0.00276) (0.00280) (0.00283) 
Religious fract. -0.000176 -0.000165 -0.000167 
 (0.000207) (0.000210) (0.000211) 
Muslim 0.00130 0.00179 0.00199 
 (0.00322) (0.00326) (0.00326) 
Urban 0.0153** 0.0181** 0.0185** 
 (0.00777) (0.00841) (0.00814) 
Age 0.000763*** 0.000767*** 0.000759*** 
 (0.000119) (0.000120) (0.000120) 
Constant 0.00195 0.00218 0.00239 
 (0.0187) (0.0238) (0.0193) 
    
Obs. 14,937 14,848 14,848 
R-squared 0.043 0.042 0.043 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: All regressions include 34 regional fixed effects, dummies for wealth and education. Sample is restricted
to those areas where the number of people sampled in the enumeration area is superior to 10 and the proportion of
migrants in the enumeration area is less than 30%. Results are stronger if we relax this restriction. In all regressions,
samples weights are used and robust standard errors clustered at the enumeration area level.
in order to shed light on the role of heterogeneity on women.
Even though HIV status is a reliable information compared to self-reported variables,
it is based on voluntary testing. Individuals can refuse to be tested. On average re-
sponse rate is above 70% and it is higher for women rather than for men. It is also
higher in rural areas. Descriptive statistics based on the analysis of mean differences
of response rate among women suggest that those who refused are more likely to be
HIV positive (Juhn et al., 2009).14 This tends to underestimate HIV prevalence. Non
13 The sub-samples by marital status might not sum to the total number of men and women as I exclude
those who are divorced, widowed or married but not living together at the time of the survey.
14 Juhn et al. (2009) find that those who refuse are more likely to be educated, less likely to live in
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response will be explicitly addressed in the last section of the chapter.
2.3 Discordant Couples and Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization
For better understanding the difference between serostatus of men and women and if
infection occurred due to own behavior or that of partner’s, I focus on couples which
are HIV concordant or discordant. HIV concordant couples are married or cohabiting
partners for at least five years and their serostatus coincides-HIV positive or HIV
negative. If their serostatus does not coincide, they can be an HIV discordant couple
where either the woman or the man is HIV positive. To this aim, I exploit the date-set
of couples where HIV status is discordant. Out of 7,171 couples interviewed with
information on their serostatus, 5.5% of them are in a discordant couple. 424 women
and 411 men are HIV positive with married or cohabiting marital status.
Discordance among couples might occur due to risky sexual behavior with extramar-
ital partners before or after marriage. It also depends if the couple is polygamous i.e.
infection of a man might have occurred from own second partner and still be in a dis-
cordant couple. Approximately, all HIV positive married women and men are equally
distributed between concordant and discordant couples. By restricting the sample to
couples married for a determined period of time, i.e. ten years if data allows or five
if else, HIV discordant cases are good proxies for effective extramarital sex15. By
effective extramarital, I refer to HIV infection that occurred due to sexual encounter
outside wedlock, given the partner is HIV negative.
Table 6 shows results on discordant couples. The proportion of men and women who
are in a discordant status are comparable. I first consider the impact of ethno-linguistic
heterogeneity on the probability of being in a discordant couple. Ethno-linguistic
heterogeneity is positively associated with the probability of being in a discordant
couple and it approximately measures effective risky behavior of both the husband and
wife given the couple is married for a certain period of time. The effect on discordance
is then split by wife’s or husband’s serostatus on a sample of couples who are married
or cohabiting for at least five years. Results suggest a positive effect of ethno-linguistic
heterogeneity on the probability of being in a discordant couple. The effect is stronger
for discordant couples with the wife being HIV positive as shown in Column (3) and
(4) . The excluded categories are concordant couples and discordant couples when the
husband is HIV positive. The analysis on men is presented in Column (5) and (6).
rural areas and more likely to be in the wealthiest quintile. This is a similar pattern which separates HIV
positive and HIV negative women.
15 In some cases, I restrict the sample to couples married for 5 years in order to increase sample size.
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Table 6 shows HIV positive women are more likely to be in a discordant couple, with
infection more likely to have occurred after marriage and in areas with high values of
ethno-linguistic heterogeneity. Even though women are biologically more exposed to
HIV than men, the restriction of the sample to a minimum of five year marriage allows
to infer that their infection occurred with extramarital relation.16 Column (3) and
(4) highlight the role of gender and it distinguishes the paper from results presented
previously in the literature; it shows that women are more likely to be infected with
HIV from out-of-wedlock sexual relation in heterogeneous areas, while the same does
not hold for men’s infection.
2.4 Sensitivity Analysis
The Effect of ELF on Risky Sexual Behavior
There are numerous factors that influence individual’s risky sexual behavior: general
individual level characteristics (age, education, wealth, marital status, health), social
characteristics (communities’ ethnic or religious identities), knowledge and exposure
to HIV/AIDS and cost of HIV infection and prevention. In the sample, 17% of indi-
viduals declared at least one extramarital sex in the last twelve months with relevant
heterogeneity among countries. Out of the total number of men sampled, 25% de-
clared at least one versus 11% of women, showing that women reported less risky
sexual behavior than men.
I test if results found on HIV test are reflected on declared extramarital sex. I define
extramarital sex as sex with non marital or cohabiting partner. The mechanism through
which ethno-linguistic heterogeneity impacts HIV status is the same through which it
impacts extramarital sex. It is believed that the main route of HIV transmission in
sub-Saharan Africa is heterosexual sex. The impact of the indicators on risky sexual
behavior is evaluated with the following reduced form:
si,c = α+βHc + γXi,c +δDr + εi,c (6)
where si,c is the number of declared extramarital relations of individual i in community
c. Following earlier definition, Hc is ethno-linguistic or religious heterogeneity in the
16 The conclusion is based on the assumption that the main channel of HIV infection is heterosexual
sex.
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community, Xi,c is a set of individual control variables in community c and Dr is a set
of dummies at regional level.
Table 7 reports results based on Poisson regression of declared extramarital sex on het-
erogeneity and other control variables. As in the above analysis, there is a positive and
significant impact of ethno-linguistic heterogeneity on the number of declared extra-
marital relation.17 Married women report higher number of extramarital sex in more
heterogeneous societies. Similarly, married men also report higher number of sexual
partners in heterogeneous societies, but the magnitude is lower. For married women,
the table suggests a 0.0135 points increase in the difference in logs of expected num-
ber of extramarital partners in the last 12 months when heterogeneity increases by
one percentage points keeping the other variables constant. This implies that married
women, to some extent married men as well, tend to engage in risky sexual behavior
in heterogeneous societies by confirming the above analysis.
Public Good Provision
Ethno-linguistic heterogeneity and public goods provision has been discussed in the
literature for its role on conflicts and heterogeneous preferences, as well as tastes
(Alesina et al., 1999; Alesina et al., 2000; Alesina et al., 2003 ; Alesina et al., 2005).
In these studies, a possible mechanism through which ethno-linguistic heterogeneity
affects HIV status might be due to public policies or public good provision at com-
munity or regional level. In light of this, regional and rural/urban dummies should
capture any difference in the provision of public policies related to HIV/AIDS epi-
demics. Those dummies capture any public policy that is specific to the region. In-
deed a common characteristic of African countries is the role played by policy makers
in enhancing regional and ethnic favoritism in the allocation of governmental funds or
public good provision, as emphasized in Lierberman (2007). I argue that the dummies
capture potential bias due to ethnic favoritism in addressing government funds against
HIV at regional level. Moreover, results do not change when replicated with ethnic
fixed effects.
17 As in the above regressions, the database includes all eligible men and women who are resident in
those enumeration areas with at least 10 individuals sampled and with a baseline density. I also restricted
the sample to those areas where 80% of the individuals are residents for at least 10 years.
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Compliance in HIV Test
Response rate in the data-set varies across countries, urban/rural areas and gender.
Compliance is approximately 4.4% in Cameroon, 14.4% in Ethiopia, 18.5% in Kenya
and 23.9% in Malawi. Different levels of response rates might over/underestimate
HIV prevalence and bias the parameter of interest if compliance is correlated with
ethno-linguistic heterogeneity. In Figure1-3, I show the correlation between these
variables. On the vertical axis of Figure 1 is the quintile distribution of HIV prevalence
at enumeration area level while in Figure 2 and Figure3 is the quartile distribution of
the ELF. They are all positively correlated implying a potential bias in the estimator.
Fig. 1: HIV Prevalence by Compliance Quintiles.
Fig. 2: HIV Prevalence by ELF Quantiles
Fig. 3: HIV Compliance by ELF Quantiles
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Table 8 presents mean differences between compliers and non. The ELF is statisti-
cally different among the two groups. Those who do not comply for an HIV test are
more likely to be richer, educated and never married. They are also more likely to be
migrants and to be living in urban areas, where on average ELF is higher. In terms of
risky sexual behavior, non compliers tend to report low number of risky behavior and
to have been tested for HIV 18. The bias of the parameters is sever to the extent non
compliance is large or if compliance predicts the probability of being HIV positive
and, finally, to the extent compliance is correlated with ELF.
Tab. 8: Socio-Economic Difference between Compliers and Non Compliers
(a) Mean Difference between Compliers and Non Compliers of HIV Test
(b) Mean Difference between Compliers and Non Compliers of HIV Test
To measure the severity of the bias, I replicate the above results on sub-samples based
on areas with different levels of compliance: all compliant areas and areas above and
below the median compliance rate. Table 9 shows the sign and significance of the
18 There are studies stating that HIV prevalence, refusal and prior testing rates are highly correlated.
Socio-economic characteristics which predict HIV status are more likely to predict non compliance.
Moreover, Eaton et al. (2009) demonstrated that, in Malawi, HIV positive individuals who know their
status are almost five times more likely to refuse testing than HIV negative individuals.
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parameters in all the three sub-samples. In the first two columns, I report results
on the overall sample for comparison. Column 3 and 4 restrict the sample on those
enumeration areas where response rate is full. The magnitude of the parameter de-
creases, but the sign and significance persist. In Column 5 and 6, I present results
on the sample of individuals who live in enumeration areas with compliance is above
the median, while Column 7 and 8 present results for areas where compliance is be-
low the median. The main difference between Column 4, 6 and 8 is the increasing
number of compliance. The magnitude of the coefficient increases with the increasing
number of compliance. They decrease when adding controls that are likely to predict
compliance and HIV status like wealth, education and migration, as shown in Table
8. Compliance does not drive the main conclusion of our result. Indeed the effect
of ethno-linguistic heterogeneity is not totally driven by sample selection because the
coefficient on ELF persists in all the regressions, as shown in Table 9. Moreover, com-
pliance is more likely to occur in areas where HIV prevalence is low, implying sample
selection of homogeneous areas and downward bias in HIV prevalence. These areas
are also likely to be homogeneous in ethno-linguistic heterogeneity. Comparing the
magnitude of the coefficients on ethno-linguistic heterogeneity in Column 2, 4 and
6 results suggest the parameters increase with the degree of non-compliance in the
sample.
Migration and Commercial Areas
The main conclusion of the paper might be driven by inflow of migration: presence of
migrants in an area affect ethno-linguistic heterogeneity and at the sometime migrants
are likely to practice high risk sexual activities compared to non migrants. In all
regressions, we control for migration where I define migrant an individual who has
not been living in the place of interview for more than ten years. Ten years is the
minimum number to identify those who have contracted the virus in their actual place
of residence.
Unfortunately, data do not allow to control for seasonal migration but being a phe-
nomenon of rural areas, it does not affect the main conclusion of the paper.
Alongside the same reasoning, commercial or trading areas might bias the parameters
if correlated with migration and transactional sex at the same time. To this purpose the
sample is restricted, throughout the paper, to areas with 80% of the people interviewed
being residents for at least 10 years. This should allow to rule out areas affected by
in-or-out flow of migrants and commercial areas.
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Tab. 9: The Effect of ELF on HIV status with different levels of compliance
LPM (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ELF 0.000584*** 0.000321*** 0.000441*** 0.000257** 0.000736*** 0.000423*** 0.000825*** 0.000538***
(7.49e-05) (7.79e-05) (0.000106) (0.000108) (0.000144) (0.000145) (0.000187) (0.000202)
Regional FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Female 0.0243*** 0.0237*** 0.0289*** 0.0175**
(0.00370) (0.00511) (0.00680) (0.00858)
Richest -0.0391*** -0.0432*** -0.0292*** -0.0458***
(0.00715) (0.0125) (0.0107) (0.0166)
Richer -0.0337*** -0.0397*** -0.0261** -0.0260
(0.00751) (0.0128) (0.0110) (0.0171)
Middle -0.0208*** -0.0219* -0.0212** -0.00723
(0.00668) (0.0113) (0.0102) (0.0154)
Poorer -0.0115* -0.0104 -0.0127 -0.00436
(0.00616) (0.0110) (0.00868) (0.0148)
Primary 0.0170*** 0.0195*** 0.0157* 0.00961
(0.00454) (0.00510) (0.00885) (0.0120)
Secondary 0.0105* 0.00384 0.0194 0.00949
(0.00602) (0.00702) (0.0123) (0.0146)
Higher -0.0131 -0.000145 -0.0172 -0.0209
(0.0104) (0.0208) (0.0177) (0.0184)
Migrant 0.0156*** 0.0127** 0.0172*** 0.0214***
(0.00358) (0.00539) (0.00613) (0.00750)
Urban 0.00978* 0.00789 0.0148 0.00885
(0.00589) (0.00856) (0.0107) (0.0152)
Married -0.0708*** -0.0460*** -0.0717*** -0.118***
(0.00745) (0.0106) (0.0119) (0.0190)
Never Married -0.109*** -0.0820*** -0.105*** -0.171***
(0.00792) (0.0116) (0.0124) (0.0192)
Constant 0.0411* 0.104*** -0.000303 0.0718*** 0 -0.0413*** 0.0273 0.139***
(0.0238) (0.0253) (0.000425) (0.0179) (3.93e-07) (0.0119) (0.0273) (0.0366)
Observations 30,139 30,139 13,133 13,133 10,366 10,366 6,640 6,640
R-squared 0.041 0.065 0.039 0.059 0.043 0.067 0.045 0.082
Robust standard errors are clustered at enumeration area level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent Variable: HIV Status
Total Sample All Compliers % Complier above Median % Complier below Median
Notes: The dependent variable is the probability of being HIV positive. In the first column we represent results for
the total sample, with and without controls, for ease of comparison. In column 3 and 4, we present results for areas
where the percentage of compliers were 100% at enumeration area level. For areas where non response was above
zero, we split the sample into 2: above or below the median value of non response rate. The median value was 15.8%.
In Column 5 and 6 we present results where response rate was above 15.8 while in column 7 and 8 is the reverse.
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I further show to what extent the results on ELF can be attributed to migration. I
analyze the proportion of migrants at enumeration area in Table 10. The table shows
how the parameter of interest changes with different levels of migration. Migration
induces an upward bias on the parameter of interest. This holds in Column 2 and 3
with different levels of migration: years of residence below 10 and 5. Column 4 shows
the coefficient on permanent residents compared to individuals not born in the place
of interview. The impact of ELF on HIV status is robust to a set of controls and the
indicators of migration (Column 5, 6 and 7).
2.5 Conclusions
This chapter used the most recent nationally representative surveys from four sub-
Saharan countries, spatially comparable, to analyze the effect of ethno-linguistic frac-
tionalization on HIV epidemics. The paper emphasizes the role gender plays when
engaging in risky sexual behavior. Women’s behavior tend to be more elastic to ethno-
linguistic heterogeneity than men’s. The hypothesis is tested on declared extramarital
sex of women, their HIV status and the probability of being in a discordant couple
where she is HIV positive. The study puts forward an original finding by emphasizing
two channels which underline the role social environment plays on women’s behavior
and their HIV status. This role can be attributed to the probability of being detected
from deviating behaviors, as emphasized in Pongou (2011), and gender discrepancy
in the cost associated to social sanctions when engaging in extramarital sex.
The study further disentangles the effect of ethno-linguistic heterogeneity on own
status that is attributable to own risky sexual behavior from that of the husband’s risky
behavior. Based on a sample of HIV positive individuals who are in a discordant
couple, I test ethno-linguistic heterogeneity on the probability of being in a discordant
couple and show that the indicators have a positive impact on women’s HIV positive
status with non infected husbands and infection occurred after marriage. This confirms
that women’s behavior tend to differ from men’s when they internalize social costs due
to deviating behaviors.
The paper contributes in underlining community level characteristics that shape indi-
vidual’s risky behavior that are necessary when addressing specific prevention poli-
cies. Mostly, the analysis contributes in better understanding the gender difference
that exist when engaging in extramarital sex and the consequence on HIV prevalence.
The paper sheds light on the different mechanisms that shape the patterns of HIV
prevalence across regions, sex and socio-economic characteristics.
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3 Free Access to HAART and Pregnancy Response among HIV
Patients. A Case Study from Cameroon
The emergence of Highly Active Anti-Retro-Viral Therapy (HAART) has allowed for
sensible improvement in quality of life for people living with HIV/AIDS. In the past,
with the Bamako Initiative-1987, many developing countries charged patients fees for
health care delivery with the aim of cost recovering and health-care funding. Not by
chance, in many Sub-Saharan African countries, more than half of the total health
expenditure is borne by households. This persistence of user fees for healthcare, espe-
cially for HAART, decreased adherence and treatment effectiveness. The decrease in
the price of treatment coupled with increasing donor support for HIV/AIDS programs
has induced an incredible increase in access to treatment.
In Cameroon, until May 2007, HIV positive patients used to pay for treatment, labo-
ratory tests and physicians’ consultations. Since 2007, the government made HAART
treatment free of charge for all HIV positive patients based on the WHO guidelines.
By June 2008, 50000 patients i.e. 58% of the estimated total HIV-positive patients
were benefiting from ART.19 The policy has given many patients in Cameroon longer
life expectancy and better health outcomes in a very short period (Wools-Kaloustian et
al., 2006). The benefits of HIV/AIDS treatment go beyond the direct health outcomes
and impact socio-economic status of indivduals and ultimately micro-macroeconomic
determinants of developing countries. Different dimensions of these treatment bene-
fits have been object of study in the past 10-15 years.
While the direct benefits of treatment are large and known, a concern arises in bal-
ancing these benefits with the risk of HIV incidence. Health benefits of treatment
are likely to influence individuals’ perception on the epidemics and alter their sexual
behavior. The change in risky sexual behavior can be due to reproductive choices or
utility from non protected sex both among infected and non infected. The overall and
net effect of treatment depends on several factors.
Firstly, the HAART therapy has a direct effect on life expectancy (Marins et al., 2003;
Goldie et al., 2006). Not only individuals will be infectious for a longer period of time
but they might also modify their reproductive choice for various reasons. The psycho-
logical cost of learning own HIV infection is perceived as reduced life expectancy be-
19 Ministère de la Santé Publique and Comité National de Lutte contre le VIH/Sida du Cameroun.
Vers l’accès universel au traitement et à la prise en charge du VIH/Sida chez les adultes et les enfants au
Cameroun [in French]. Yaounde: Ministère de la Santé Publique and Comité National de Lutte contre le
VIH/Sida du Cameroun; 2008.
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cause there is uncertainty in the efficacy and availability of HAART treatment. Once
individuals are on treatment, their choices on reproductive behavior and intended preg-
nancy depends on perceived life expectancy which they update by observing objective
measures of their present health outcomes. There is no general consensus on the sign
and magnitude of the theoretical and empirical prediction of adult mortality on fertil-
ity.
Secondly, with HAART individuals gain their full functional capacity by becoming
less susceptible to other opportunistic diseases and attractive in the matching market
(Koenig et al., 2004; Laurent et al., 2002; Coetzee et al., 2004). Several papers found
a positive impact of treatment on risky sexual behavior: Lakdawalla et al. (2004)
among HIV positive individuals in the US; Mechoulan (2007) among homosexuals in
San Francisco; Goldstein et al. (2007) in rural Kenya and De Walque et al. (2010)
in Mozambique. Goldman et al. (2006) used an IV strategy to show that the provi-
sion of treatment increased the number of new partners for HIV positive individuals.
On the other side, improved health outcomes of individuals increase the likelyhood
of pregnancy among HIV positive patients because HAART ameliorates fecundity.20
Thus, health benefits can increase both risky sexual behavior and unintended preg-
nancy among people living with HIV/AIDS.
Third, HAART reduces viral load and infectivity of individuals (Porco et al. 2004;
Castilla et al. 2005). Availability of HAART and lower transmission of HIV reduces
the cost of HIV infection and individuals might increase risky sexual behavior and
unintended pregnancies. On the other side, non protected sex among individuals on
treatment induces viral mutation and drug resistance. Furthermore, altruistic behavior
of individuals might increase protected sex (Bunnell et al., 2006). The net effect
of HAART and reduced cost of infection on risky sexual behavior and non intended
pregnancy remains an empirical question.
Finally, people on HAART treatment are usually enrolled in a treatment program
which comprises counseling on HIV and sexual behavior. Many studies have ad-
dressed the impact of educational campaign on HIV/AIDS with mixed or no results
on unprotected sex (Duflo et al., 2006 and Bertozzi et al., 2006). Dupas (2006) finds
a positive effect of age-specific educational campaign on inter-generational sex for
school girls.
The above channels induce behavioral change in risky sexual behavior and intended-or
unintended-pregnancies. The overall net outcome remains an empirical question. The
20 HAART restores menstrual disorder and reduces vaginal infections.
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study takes advantage of firsthand data collected on women enrolled in a treatment
program at the Central Hospital of Yaounde in 2010. The sample consists of HIV pos-
itive women, with part of them on treatment. I use the staggered timing of patient’s
date of treatment initiation between 2003-2010 to estimate the association between
treatment and intended -or unintended-pregnancy. I use as controls, women who are
not yet on treatment at the time of the survey. Pregnancy is an objective measurement
of risky sexual behavior and understanding the role of HAART on the two types of
pregnancy has different policy implications. I first implement a Diff-in-Diff approach
in a moving-window set-up and further enrich the analysis by using panel data anal-
ysis where I control for individual and time fixed effects. The approach allows for
individual specific trends where I separate pre-existing trends from dynamic response
to treatment. I also extend the analysis by including a differential trend between the
pre and the post treatment period.
Results suggest that HAART increased intended pregnancy among HIV positive women
by 15 percentage points on average. These increase is heterogeneous by year of treat-
ment initiation: the coefficient is increasing in magnitude for individuals who start
treatment in recent years with a big jump being characterized in 2007. This is in line
with the literature in epidemiology, suggesting treatment increases pregnancy among
women living with HIV/AIDS. Additionally, treatment effect is heterogeneous by the
number of children born before treatment initiation. Women starting treatment with
zero number of children before treatment initiation are the most affected by treatment.
Given the total fertility rate for women living in Yaounde amounts to three, I show
that the effect of treatment is such that it does not increase the total fertility rate. Ini-
tial CD-4 also matters for pregnancy response; women who start treatment with CD-4
above the average are most likely to be pregnant after treatment initiation. The CD4
count is an important indicator of disease progression among HIV-infected individu-
als.
Different analysis suggest that the above results are not driven solely by the direct
health effect of treatment related to risky sexual behavior and non intended pregnancy.
Indeed, I show that results hold if I control for individuals who start treatment for
reasons related to menstrual disorder. I further show that coefficients on treatment
are time dependent, suggesting free access had an important role in fertility decision;
finally, I find that treatment is most effective among a sub-population of individuals,
i.e. with zero number of children before treatment initiation. These results provide
evidence in support of a need for a broader interpretation of the behavioral response
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of pregnancy that is not solely driven by health benefits.
To my knowledge, up-to-date nobody has analyzed the impact of ART treatment on
pregnancy proxied for sexual behavior in the economics literature. In epidemiology,
Myer et al. (2010) found that ART doubles the chances of becoming pregnant among
HIV-infected women in sub-Saharan Africa. In their analysis, one third of women who
initiated ART experienced pregnancy within four years after their initiation. In the
same line, other papers have underlined that HAART restores fertility among HIV pa-
tients with fertility desire changing over time (see for example Blair et al. (2004) and
Massad et al. (2004)). Among the few longitudinal studies on fertility preferences,
Homsy et al. (2009) report that pregnancy significantly increased over follow-up.
However, even though fertility intentions increased over time, they were much lower
compared to the pregnancies encountered among couples. The behavioral mecha-
nisms that underlie this association have not been further investigated by previous
studies for lack of information.
The analysis proceeds as follows: data are presented in Section 3.1 and empirical
strategy in Section 3.2. In Section 3.3, I present the results while in Section 3.4 and
3.4 heterogeneity of parameters are tested by sub-population. I discuss limitations of
the results in Section 3.5 and concluding remarks are laid in Section3.6.
3.1 Data
The Day-Hospital in the Central Hospital of Yaounde has been active since 1998. It
is a public structure, one of the biggest and the first to provide HIV treatment on a
large scale. It offers several services among which: Voluntary Counseling and Test-
ing, Sexually Transmitted Diseases Counseling, Dermatitis, Psychological Support,
Social Assistance and General Counseling for people living with HIV. Once infected,
patients can live for several years, with their health declining, until they reach the
acquired immune deficiency syndrome status (AIDS). The virus’s degree of advance-
ment is measured by CD4 counts and once patients reach AIDS status they are put on
treatment. 21 Else, their survival is very low due to opportunistic diseases. Patients
monitor their CD4 count and viral load every 6 months until they become eligible. A
Committee of medical doctors and personnel from the hospital decide on patient’s el-
igibility. Once on treatment they renew their medical prescription every three months
for HAART. The number of individuals who are detected HIV positive and put on
21 The threshold of CD4 for treatment initiation, as suggested by the WHO, is a CD4 count of less than
350/mm3 for 2010 onwards. Previously the threshold was 200/mm3.
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treatment have increased over years. Patients differ in terms of HIV detection and
treatment initiation. About 400 HIV positive women on treatment and 135, not yet
on treatment by 2010, were interviewed.22 Most of the time, individuals get tested
for HIV due to pregnancy and Program on Mother To Child Transmission (PMTCT);
however, enrollment to treatment involves other reasons among which, dermatitis,
TBC, amenorrhea, diarrhea or fever. Although data is not available for all, more detail
is provided in Table 11. Shortage of personnel in the hospital implies that medical
records are not fully compiled. Information for a total of 228 patients was collected
from medical records.
Tab. 11: Medical Record on date of Treatment Initiation
AMENORHE 14 6.14%
ANEMIE 4 1.75%
DERMATITIS 86 37.72%
DIARHEE 16 7.02%
FEVER 27 11.84%
PREGNANCY 6 2.63%
HEPATITE B 2 0.88%
TBC/COUGH 20 8.77%
TRANSFERED 4 1.75%
WEIGHT LOSS 2 0.88%
NO FLAG 47 20.61%
Total 228
I collected information on women aged between 15-49 years on self-reported knowl-
edge about HIV/AIDS, as well as their sexual behavior, birth history and socio-economic
indicators. Sexual behavior and pregnancy history was collected confidentially within
the hospital. The main variable of interest childbearing where I distinguish between
desired and non desired pregnancy. I retrospectively identified each pregnancy with
birth recalling and constructed a panel which varies between 2003-2010. The con-
ventional measure of intended/unintended pregnancy from the standard DHS surveys
is used for ease of interpretation. Each questionnaire is matched then with objective
information from their medical record where date of HIV test, treatment initiation,
CD4 count and reasons for treatment and HIV detection was recorded.
Given the main variable of interest is birth history of women, a major drawback with
recalling might be miss-reporting if women forget the birth of a child who died. One
22 Very few patients had been on treatment for more than five years while a good percentage started
in 2007.
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can argue that women recall better the birth of a child after treatment because more
recent and in which case biases the results upwards. However, information is collected
on a restricted window and over the last seven years so it is less likely miss-recalling
biases birth history of women. Moreover, women who discovered to be HIV positive
are less likely to miss-recall sexual behavior or child birth because it might have af-
fected partner’s infection. Another variable of interest is intended birth history which
is collected retrospectively, a potential drawback arises from measurement error. It is
mainly based on ex-post rationalization of individual’s desire for fertility and might
be limited in its utility because it is based on the assumption all women have fully
formed intentions at the time of conception. Bias is likely to arise from several factors
like gender of the child, education of the mother, marital status, partner’s intentions
and etc.23
Almost all women in the data are aware of PMTCT and, therefore, the possibility for
HIV positive women to give birth to a healthy child. There is no statistical difference
on knowledge about all risks of vertical transmission between women who are on
treatment and not. Indeed, HAART reduces child mortality among both groups of
HIV positive women. PMTCT puts all pregnant women on treatment some months
before and after childbearing. As such, they can avoid vertical transmission from the
mother to the child while pregnant and during breastfeeding. When women enroll for
PMTCT, they might, or not, already have reached AIDS status. If so, she will keep
on with HAART treatment by renewing every three months her medical prescription.
Else, she monitors her CD4 until eligible for treatment. The In Table 12, I provide
descriptive statistics by year of treatment initiation, age, education and pregnancy pre
and post treatment.
The average number children born after treatment increases over time as shown in
Figure 4. Before 2007, women on treatment had lower number of births per woman
as compared to HIV positive women not yet on treatment. However, after the policy
there is a catch-up between intended and unintended births.
23 A more complete analysis on measures of fertility preferences can be found in Pritchett (1994).
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Fig. 4: Birth Trends: Total, Intended and Unintended
In the era of HIV/AIDS and HAART, reproductive behaviors is a matter of public
health which needs to be separated from risky sexual behavior. Indeed, about 75% of
patients declared to desire a child within the next two years maximum, 20% responded
not to desire any, and the remaining want a child in the near future. In the majority
of the cases, among the reasons reported for not wanting a child was marital status
or lack of a partner. Disclosure of HIV status and couples counseling was indeed
another threat to public health. Independently from marital status, partner’s HIV status
is unknown to the patient in the majority of the cases, as well as her status to the
partner. Subjective perception of future life expectancy among the patients is crucial
in reproductive health. To a question formulated in the following manner: “According
to you, by how much is HAART known to prolong life expectancy of people living
with HIV/AIDS?”. They had to choose between different options: a) 15-20 years or
more, b) 10-15 years, c) 5-10 years? and d) I don’t know. I find a statistical difference
between women who were on treatment and those who did not yet start treatment. A
higher percentage of women on treatment chose the option “15-20” or more. Among
those not yet on treatment they revealed higher uncertainty by choosing the option “I
don’t know”. Furthermore, to the question if AIDS was like any other chronic disease,
I found women on treatment were more likely to choose the yes option. More details
are provided in Table 13.
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Tab. 13: Mean Comparison between Treated and Non-Treated on Perception of
HIV/AIDS
Variable Non Treated Treated Difference P-Value Non Treated Treated
1 Good Knowledge of PMTCT 0.644 0.620 -0.024 0.336 101 292
2 Knows Someone With AIDS 0.530 0.735 0.204 *** 1.000 100 290
3 Life expectancy 15-20 0.610 0.736 0.126 *** 0.992 100 292
4 Certain about future Life Expectancy 0.700 0.788 0.088 ** 0.963 100 292
5 Perceive AIDS as a chronic Disease 0.812 0.877 0.065 * 0.947 101 292
6 Certain about AIDS Chronic/not Chronic 0.891 0.949 0.058 ** 0.977 101 292
Mean Observations
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Note: The Variables: “Certain about future Life Expectancy” and “Certain about AIDS Chronic/not Chronic” are
complement to the answer “I don’t know”. Women on treatment are less likely to take the option “I don’t know”
on their future life expectancy and whether AIDS is a chronic disease. Robust standard errors are clustered at the
enumeration area level.
3.2 Empirical Strategy
Treatment initiation is determined by an interaction of individual’s CD-4 count and a
random shock due to any kind of infectious disease. As discussed above, assignment
to treatment results from either eligibility based on CD-4 counts (disease progression
to AIDS) or critical health status (co-infection with other diseases like for example
tuberculosis or hepatitis). CD4 counts are unlikely to be directly self-monitored by
patients but can be a result of unobservable or observable individual characteristics
like living standards.
PMTCT programs induce selection on pregnancy as women discover their status, level
of CD4 count and treatment availability with pregnancy. Reverse causality puts in
cause the internal validity of inference as pregnancy among HIV positive women in-
duces treatment and vice-versus. With the PMTCT program, if the woman’s disease
has not progressed to AIDS, she is eligible for treatment only three months before and
after child delivery. The analysis of this chapter is based on in treatment initiation
due to progression to AIDS. Moreover, the Day Hospital of Yaounde is not specific
to PMTCT so women on treatment are enrolled for several reasons and are likely to
differ on many aspects. In any case, in the main analysis, I excluding women who
started treatment or discovered their HIV status in the same year they had a child. The
total amount of patients excluded are 92. Finally, PMTCT bias downwards the pa-
rameters of interest and does not affect the conclusion of the chapter as those women
are less likely to bear a child after one year of treatment. Our results are based on the
probability of childbearing in “t+1” given the women started treatment in “t”. Those
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women had a child in “t” so this makes them unlikely to bear a child in “t+1”.
The analysis is based on time variation of treatment and pregnancy. I measure if
change in fertility is associated with treatment initiation by controlling for unobserved
individual and time fixed effects. Initially, the empirical strategy is based on the so
called moving window where I consider two treatment periods.24 I compare the aver-
age probability of giving birth in period ‘t+1’ compared to period ‘t’ for an individual
who begins treatment in period ‘t’. Controls for these individuals are those who start
treatment in period ’t+2’ where I look at their behavior in “t” and “t+1”.25 Each group
of individuals who start treatment in different years have their own controls within a
data-set constructed with two time periods: “pre ” and “post”. The moving window
implies replacement of these controls and treated in the database. Some individuals
are considered controls or treated at different points in time. In the study, patients are
not replaced more than twice: as controls and treated. I restrict controls to individuals
who start treatment in t+2 such that treated and controls are as comparable as possible.
The choice of “t” and “t+1” is motivated by biological considerations: patients react
to HAART and give birth after one year of treatment. If they conceive a child in the
same year they started treatment, they are likely to give birth the year after. Individuals
might also start treatment after conception and in this case the parameter of interest
will be downward biased but the main conclusion of the paper will not be affected.
Upon the constructed data-set, I use difference-in-differences approach, extended by
adding a vector of individual characteristics to control for differences in observables
between the groups at baseline. I estimate regression of the following form:
outcomei = β0 +β1ARTi +β2Post +β3ARTi ∗Post +pikXi + τt + εi (7)
where outcome is birth of individual i in period t (or intended-birth); ART is a treat-
ment dummy if individual ’i’ started treatment in year t; Post is the post-treatment
period, i.e. a ‘t+1’ dummy constructed from the moving window. Finally, τt repre-
sent year dummies and Xi is a set of observable characteristics which includes age,
education and childbearing in ‘t-1’. The empirical strategy based on moving window
24 This method has been applied in labor economics by Monteiro (2004) in estimating the effect of
privatization on wages in Portugal. It has first been used in Kluve et al. (1999). A good advantage of the
moving window is the short period of analysis pre-post, which avoids auto-correlation in the error terms
and allows to control for baseline characteristics that are time invariant.
25 I also replicate the results by looking at behavior in‘t-1’ as compared to ‘t+1’. The reason why I
focus on ‘t’ rather than on ‘t-1’ is to avoid loss of observations because individuals who start treatment
in 2003 cannot be evaluated. Moreover, patients who start treatment in ‘t+2’ are physically better off in
‘t-2’ and cannot serve as controls for those treated in ‘t’.
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allows to control for individual fixed effects, to account for unobserved heterogene-
ity constant over time, and for time-invariant variation across individuals. However,
the moving-window analysis does not control for different trends in the treatment and
control groups.26 To this purpose , I further extend the analysis with panel data-set
on a larger window, from 2003-2010 and identify the treatment effect from variation
within the individuals over time. Additionally, I control for individual specific trend
that vary across individuals. It represents a flexible way to control for heterogeneous
pregnancy behavior. I also allow the trend to depend on treatment initiation: in addi-
tion to shifting the level of outcome, treatment also affects the trend.
outcomeit = θi + τt +θit +β1ARTit−1 +β2ARTit−1 ∗ t +β3kXit + εit (8)
3.3 Impact of Treatment on Pregnancy
Results from the Moving-Window
Table 14 shows results from the estimation of treatment on total and intended preg-
nancy based on Equation (7). One year of treatment is likely to increase the probability
of childbearing on average by 6.36 % points compared to women who start treatment
2 years later. Very similar patterns with slightly higher coefficients are observed in
column 2 and 4 for intentionally conceived children i.e. 7.3 % points. It is impor-
tant to control for age, education and birth in period “t-1” due to upward bias in the
parameter of interest.
26 It is based on the Diff-in-Diff approach, which assumes parallel trend between the two groups.
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Tab. 14: Coefficients from DIFFinDIFF based on the Moving Window: Birth in t+1
compared to t
Dependent  Variable
Total 
Pregnancy Desired
Total 
Pregnancy Desired
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post 0.0132 -0.0132 0.0219 -0.00834
(0.0224) (0.0197) (0.0247) (0.0217)
ART -0.0759*** -0.0693*** -0.0676*** -0.0636***
(0.0152) (0.0146) (0.0187) (0.0174)
Post*ART 0.0852*** 0.0870*** 0.0636* 0.0730**
(0.0294) (0.0259) (0.0344) (0.0304)
Age 0.0244 0.0290**
(0.0152) (0.0118)
Age sq -0.000508** -0.000529***
(0.000256) (0.000203)
Lagged Child -0.0484*** -0.0405***
(0.0169) (0.0134)
Education -0.00616*** -0.00381**
(0.00232) (0.00189)
Year FE YES YES
Constant 0.0759*** 0.0693*** -0.120 -0.264
(0.0152) (0.0146) (0.217) (0.162)
Observations 1,095 1,095 1,024 1,024
R-squared 0.022 0.016 0.045 0.030
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The dependent variables in the first and third columns are total number of children born while in column two
and four we refer to intended births.
I further decompose the average treatment effect on childbearing over the last seven
years based on year of treatment initiation. I show the heterogeneity of the parame-
ter in Table 15. Each column is a difference-in-difference estimator of treatment and
control groups on desired pregnancy or else it is a sub-sample of the moving-window
illustrated in Table 14. The magnitude and sign of one year treatment effect varies
across patients. Interestingly, women who started treatment in earlier years were less
likely to bear a child after one year of treatment while after the policy, women increas-
ingly have intended pregnancy.27
27 Lack of observations might render the results imprecise for inference. However, same results are
found from panel data analysis.
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Results from Individual Specific Slopes depending on Treatment Initiation
In this paragraph I exploit information on a larger window as compared to the difference-
in-difference conducted with the moving-window setup. In Table 16, I run different
regressions on overall the sample, including women who were not yet on treatment
in 2010. Column 1 shows results from a simple regression for ease of comparison
while in Column 2, I control for fixed effects to capture unobserved heterogeneity at
the individual level. The coefficient on treatment is quite sensitive to the propensity of
childbearing of individuals that is constant over time. In Column 3 , year fixed effects
reveal comparable results as in the moving window. Individual and year fixed effects
explain a good part of the variability in pregnancy.
Column 4 allows for individual specific trends that capture unobserved factors influ-
encing pregnancy at individual level to have a linear trend and allow this trend to vary
across individuals. The coefficient have almost doubled: at least one year of treat-
ment increases an individual’s propensity to be pregnant by 15 percentage points. The
specification allows individuals to have their own trend which can be increasing or
decreasing depending on health status and age.
A 15 percentage point increase in pregnancy due to at least one year of treatment is
relatively a very big impact and not only in absolute terms. Compared to the mean
pregnancy rate of 0.14 in the sample, a coefficient of 15 percentage points increase
corresponds to approximately a 107% increase in pregnancy rates, i.e. treatment has
more than doubled the chance of pregnancy among HIV positive women, a very sim-
ilar result found in epidemiology.
There is a possibility that the unobservables exhibit a more complex dynamic behavior
than just a linear trend. I relax this assumption by separating out pre-existing trends
from the dynamic response of a policy shock. In first place, I allow the trend to vary
pre-post 2007 policy to investigate how treatment effect varies due to free access.
Column 5 shows that women on treatment after 2007 are more likely to increase the
average propensity of childbearing: 19.5 percentage points. This result is the average
positive effect of the Cameroonian 2007 policy on free access to treatment on all
treated women.
In Column 6, I decompose the policy effect year by year, as in Table 15. The coeffi-
cients are slightly higher and the patterns are very similar. As in the above regressions,
the coefficient of treatment effect on pregnancy increases over time compared to the
baseline. This is intuitive as HIV infection is increasingly perceived as a chronic dis-
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ease allowing individuals to conduct normal lives.
To sum up, there is a positive effect of treatment on pregnancy which is heterogeneous
by year of treatment. Women enrolled after 2007 are likely to bear a child as compared
to those before the policy. Different mechanisms might explain this finding and they
are discussed in Section3.6.
3.4 Heterogeneous Treatment Effects
Treatment Effect by the Number of Children Before treatment Initiation
Information on pre-treatment number of children enables to understand if treatment
and the 2007 policy affected total fertility rate of women living in Yaounde. I esti-
mate the coefficients by interacting treatment with pre-treatment number of children.
The total number of children pre-treatment that is invariant over time is captured by
individual fixed effects. Results are shown in Table 17.
Tab. 17: Coefficient Estimates by Number of Pre-Treatment Children
Dependent Variable
(1) (2)
ART 0.0826*** 0.120***
(0.0195) (0.0272)
ART*One Child. -0.0465
(0.0350)
ART*Two Child. -0.0510
(0.0402)
ART*Three Child. 0.0197
(0.0775)
ART*Four Child. -0.0847
(0.117)
ART*Five Child. -0.276**
(0.115)
ART*Six Child. -0.280***
(0.0411)
ART*Seven Child. -0.340***
(0.0285)
Constant 0.106*** 0.106***
(0.0143) (0.0143)
Observations 3,174 3,161
R-squared 0.008 0.010
Number of id 407 405
Pregnancy
Heterogeneity by Pre-Treatment Number of Children
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Excluded categories are women who started treatment with seven or more children before treatment initiation.
The analysis is based on year and individual fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the individual area level.
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The coefficients in Table 17 suggest that treatment affects most pregnancy among
women who start treatment without children as compared women not on treatment.
Given women in Yaounde have three children on average (DHS 2004), HAART does
not seem to affect those with positive number of children. It increases the propen-
sity by twelve percentage points among those women with respect to women not on
treatment. The effect decreases with additional number of children pre-treatment and
assumes a negative coefficient for women who had four or above children before treat-
ment initiation.
This finding is consistent with the idea treatment does not increase total fertility rate
in the population as those without children or lesser than the average are most affected
by HAART. In fact, women who had already reached the local average fertility rate
are not affected by treatment. This suggests that treatment allows women to reach
their desired number of children and does not lead to an increase in the latter. In line
with this finding, the negative coefficient on ART in Table 14 withing the analysis of
difference-in-difference suggests that HIV positive women who start treatment in a
short delay have lower number of children as compared to those who start treatment
after a longer period. The increase in birth is observed just after treatment initiation
suggesting HIV positive women are more likely to delay birth after treatment initia-
tion.
There exists a possibility of heterogeneous impact of treatment depending on mari-
tal status. Marriage patterns differ a lot from the time of registration at the hospi-
tal until the date of interview in 2010. Bargaining power among couples and intra-
household bargaining might be explaining the results depending on marital status of
women interviewed and awareness of their partner on their seropositivity. In Figure 5,
I show how unawareness on partner’s status prevails in married and cohabiting cou-
ples. Partners are unlikely to be aware of their partner’s HIV status. Moreover, those
women live in the capital city or near-by, with a good percentage of them having com-
pleted secondary school. This characteristic alleviates issues related to gender gap and
intra-household fertility decisions. It is likely that intended pregnancies declared and
observed by patients is reliable in measuring their own willingness in reproductive
choices.
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Fig. 5: Knowledge of Women on their Partner’s Status
Treatment Effect by the level of CD-4 at Treatment Initiation
The literature in epidemiology states that there is no optimal time for treatment initia-
tion. If there are no other co-infections the WHO recommended to start treatment with
CD-4 below 200 cells/ml in 2010. From 2010, the threshold is raised to 350 cells/ml
because "hit hard and early" strategy has been found to have increased survival. Re-
cent studies also support earlier initiation of treatment - even before CD4 count drops
below 350 cells/ml . Early anti-retroviral therapy has also a clinical benefit for both
HIV positive individuals and their uninfected sexual partners suggesting the use of
antiretroviral treatment as a part of a public health strategy to reduce the spread of
the epidemics (Cohen et al., 2011). In Cameroon, the average CD4 count at treat-
ment initiation is increasing over time as shown in Figure 6 suggesting that people are
increasing being screened and enrolled earlier when put on treatment.
Fig. 6: Lowess Estimate of CD4 at Treatment Initiation
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Tab. 18: Random Individual Specific Trend dependent on Initial CD-4
Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ART 0.159*** 0.201*** 0.109*** 0.139***
(0.0274) (0.0401) (0.0223) (0.0339)
(CD4<144)*ART -0.0874* -0.0637
(0.0500) (0.0401)
YEAR FE YES YES YES YES
Constant -0.0689*** -0.0699*** -0.0475** -0.0482***
(0.0224) (0.0223) (0.0184) (0.0184)
Observations 2,780 2,780 2,780 2,780
R-squared 0.010 0.011 0.009 0.010
Number of id 405 405 405 405
Pregnancy Intended Pregnancy 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Note: The variable CD4<144 takes the value 1 if CD4 is below the average. Results do not change if I consider the
median of CD4 rather than the average. We test the hypothesis on total pregnancy and intended pregnancy. Robust
standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
I test the hypothesis if response to pregnancy depends on CD-4 count at treatment
initiation, i.e. if patients who start treatment earlier are more likely to be pregnant.
Table 18 shows that women who start treatment earlier with CD-4 count above the
average have higher propensity to pregnancy. In Column (1) I replicate results from
the model where individual specific trends is controlled for i.e. Column (4) of Table
16. In Column (2) I interact treatment and a dummy of CD4 at treatment initiation
is below the sample average. The coefficient on the interaction term between CD4
below the average and treatment initiation is negative and significant at ten percent.
It is likely that women who start treatment with low values of CD4 count are worse
off and less likely to conceive a child. Similar analysis is conducted in Column (3)
and Column (4) where the dependent variable is intended pregnancy. The negative
coefficient on the interaction term is not significant with pvalue that is slightly higher
than 10%. Indeed a drawback with our analysis is variability in the dependent variable
that drastically reduces power to detect the effect.
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3.5 Threats to Internal Validity
Attrition
The above analysis is based on a random sample of individuals interviewed in the
Day Hospital of Yaounde where information was collected retrospectively on their
behavior in the past seven years. This implies that individuals enrolled in the program
recently are oversampled. Indeed, I do not take into account women who might have
died of AIDS at any point in time between 2003-2010 and were treated in the Day
Hospital. The death of these patients at any given time in the window can be due to
socio-economic characteristics affecting both fertility decisions, screening and mon-
itoring of CD4 counts . To overcome this bias, I verify if results on a more recent
window, between 2008-2010, give similar patterns as they are good representatives of
the population on treatment. Every woman between the age of 15-40 with medical
record registered from 2008 onwards was tracked by phone and interviewed at the
hospital. Attrition due to death or drop-out is smaller in this window of 2008-2010.
Column 1 of Table 19 shows the above results hold and the effect is bigger on average
in terms of magnitude. This suggests that women who are on treatment for longer
period are different and non comparable to those enrolled in recent year. They are
likely to be better-off economically with lower propensity for pregnancy. I use three
time periods to control for individual specific time specific effects and the model takes
into account individual specific trends.
Endogeneity
In this section, I check if results are not driven by omitted correlates of treatment and
pregnancy. There are time variant shocks that affect contemporaneously treatment
initiation and pregnancy that are not captured by individual fixed effects or individual
specific trends. I exploit the exogeneity of the Cameroonian policy on free scaling-up
of treatment. To this aim, I restrict the sample to individuals who started treatment on
and before 2007 such that individuals are comparable in health and socio-economic
outcomes. There are only 98 individuals who were on treatment before the policy.
Controlling for secular trend and individual fixed effects, the coefficient on pre-post
2007 should not have a direct effect on pregnancy. If the coefficient is significant it
implies that women on treatment before 2007 were all affected by a common factor
after the policy. In Column 2 of Table 19, I show that the effect of treatment depends
on the 2007 policy although not statistically robust. This suggests that the increase in
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Tab. 19: Sensitivity analysis: Attrition, Selection and Omitted Variables
Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3)
ART 0.226*** 0.00834 0.171***
(0.0447) (0.0278) (0.0362)
ART*2007 Policy 0.178*
(0.0919)
2007 Policy 0.0239
(0.0738)
Trend -0.00702
(0.0168)
YEAR FE YES YES
CLASSE AGE YES YES
Constant -0.0824 0.00296 -0.0523
(0.103) (0.0492) (0.0799)
Observations 1,186 684 2,034
R-squared 0.032 0.017 0.012
Number of id 400 98 297
Pregnancy
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: In Column 1, I show the effect of treatment on the restricted sample between 2008-2010 in order to avoid bias
due to attrition. In Column 2, I show results on the restricted sample of individuals who start treatment before 2007
and evaluate the impact of the policy as an exogenous variation. In Column 3, we restrict the sample to individuals
who start treatment in the same year they discovered their status. Standard errors are clustered at the individual area
level.
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pregnancy is partly driven by free access to ART, at least for these individuals, which
is not determined by other unobservables related to health status. As patients were
already on treatment before 2007, the coefficient captures the change in their behavior
due to free scaling-up of HAART. Figure 7 shows the average number of births per
year of 67 individuals who were already on treatment in 2006. The average number
of children born from these women is increasing over time with the big jump being
characterized after the 2007 policy. The difference is statistically significant and these
individuals are comparable in terms of health, years of infection, treatment and socio-
economic characteristics, which were all subject to similar social and economic costs
of infection.
Fig. 7: Individuals on Treatment Before 2006
Reverse causality could also confound the estimates in Table 18. Self selection of
healthy individuals with CD4 above the average might result from reproductive choices.
As such, the relationship between treatment and pregnancy could be a result of planned
pregnancy and treatment initiation. I test if results hold on a restricted sample of in-
dividuals who started treatment at the same time as were detected HIV positive. The
amount of people who started treatment the same year of HIV detection amounts
to a little less than 300 women suggesting Voluntary Counseling and Testing is not
widespread. Results in Column (3) of Table 19 shows that previous patterns are not
altered by self selection. This also rules out the case if individuals anticipated the 2007
policy and hence adapted their reproductive choices before treatment initiation.28
28 In any case, the main conclusions of the paper will not be altered because anticipation will downward
56
3.6 Discussion and Concluding Remarks
This chapter uses first hand data collected among patients in the Central Hospital of
Yaounde-Cameroon. It examines fertility response to a change in HAART availability,
a treatment which provides enormous mortality benefits to HIV positive women. I use
information on birth history collected retrospectively, date of treatment initiation, HIV
test and other socio-economic variables. The staggered timing of treatment initiation
allows to study fertility response between 2003-2010 by taking into account different
types of heterogeneity: time variant and time invariant.
Over the window of analysis, treatment is associated with an increase in pregnancy by
0.15 on average after one year of treatment, which is a big effect both in absolute and
relative terms. A 15 percentage points increase corresponds to doubling pregnancy
rate among women living with HIV/AIDS. This result is very similar to other findings
in epidemiology. I also find that treatment effect on pregnancy is time dependent.
Compared to individuals who started treatment in 2004, HAART increases pregnancy
response by 22.4 percentage points among women who started treatment after the
2007 policy. The coefficient increases over year of treatment initiation suggesting be-
havioral response that goes beyond the direct effect of health benefits. Also, treatment
effect is heterogeneous by pre-treatment number of children: pregnancy response is
highest among women who had zero number of children before treatment initiation
while non significant or negative response is found among women who started treat-
ment with at least one child. Given the average fertility per women living in Yaounde
was 3.2 in 2004 (DHS survey), it is less likely treatment increases total fertility rate
in the population. Women who started treatment with children above 3 have a neg-
ative coefficient as compared to those without any child. HAART restores fertility
in women to (partially) reach the desired fertility rate. Furthermore, I find that treat-
ment increased pregnancy among women who had higher initial CD-4 count which is
partly explained by the fact that women start treatment earlier in recent years (Figure
6). To sum up, results suggest behavioral response beyond the immediate impact on
health for the following reasons: first, the coefficient on treatment is increasing over
time with a jump being characterized in 2007; second, treatment affects significantly
a sub-population of individuals with zero number of children before treatment initi-
ation; third, results are consistent when women who got tested or started treatment
for reasons related to amenorrhea or menstrual disorder are excluded (there are few of
bias the treatment effect.
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them as illustrated in Table 11); fourth, individuals who started treatment before 2007
increased their pregnancy after the policy.
Possible different mechanisms can explain the above results. The 2007 policy might
have incentivized Voluntary Counseling and Testing (VCT) allowing individuals to
better monitor their CD-4 due to the possibility of free access to HAART. Women
starting treatment with higher CD-4 had better health outcomes and were more fe-
cund after a shorter period. Early screening can further be explained by the decreas-
ing social and psychological costs from infection. The cost associated to stigma, self-
exclusion and trauma of infection are decreasing over time and increasing number of
people are on treatment allowing patients to live a better life with the infection. Free
access to treatment also contributes in early screening of individuals and their repro-
ductive behavior due to income effect. Indeed, the 2007 policy signals indirectly long
term availability and affordability. From descriptive statistics, women on treatment
are likely to have a positive perception on their future life expectancy as shown in
Table 13.
It might also be the case that counseling and sexual education provided by health
workers has changed over time. In order to avoid attrition and control the epidemics,
health worker are increasingly educating people living with HIV that HIV/AIDS is a
chronic diseases as opposed to a mortal disease. This is likely to reduce psychological
cost of infection and encourage people to follow-up with their therapy and reduce
problems relative to drug resistance and viral mutation. In the past, HIV positive
women who became pregnant were likely to be object of criticism and stigma by
health workers.
Other possible mechanism is lower viral load and altruistic behavior of individuals
who delay birth in order not to infect own partner. However, only 35% of women
were aware of the fact that HAART reduces viral load and the treatment coefficient
is not heterogeneous by this knowledge suggesting that altruism is less likely to drive
the findings. Difference in socio-economic characteristics between those who started
treatment in earlier years vs those in recent years is also less likely to explain the above
results. The treatment coefficient on the 2007 policy as a quasi-experiment on those
who started treatment before 2006 illustrates that reproductive choices were affected
by income effect i.e. free access to treatment (Table 19).
The epidemiological implication of treatment availability and pregnancy in terms of
HIV incidence is not the object of this study. However, an important implication
of the analysis is the behavioral response of treatment on intended (or unintended)
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pregnancy, which is reflected on unprotected sex . If treatment adherence is well
developed among patients, the probability of HIV infection is dramatically reduced:
both horizontally (partner) and vertically (child). The fact that pregnancy response is
higher among women who start treatment with CD-4 higher than the average might
suggest that pregnancy occurs among women with lower viral load and infectivity.
In terms of policy implication, a more comprehensive approach that includes family-
planning and couples counseling is fundamental with treatment availability.
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4 Sex Composition of Older Siblings and Teen-Pregnancy in
Patriarchal Communities. Evidence from Central Africa
Patriarchal societies are determined by a well defined power and kin relationships
based on gender. Men often have control of the public sphere that legitimate their
role and define women’s status, privileges and rights in the society. Many commu-
nities in Sub-Saharan Africa are characterized by this form of social organization,
although with different levels of gender related power and role. Indeed, such gen-
dered power system is often based on a network of social, political and economic
relationships where men dominate and control female labor, reproduction and sex-
uality. This system has been intergenerationally transferred through the capacity of
fathers to bequeath to their sons the power to control and monitor female members
of the household when young and command the resources and operate over the labor
force of their wives and children when old. In such a set-up, it is likely sex compo-
sition of siblings has a direct affect on women’s well-being within the household by
factors that are not driven by parental choices or allocations. This chapter aims to
address this particular characteristics that sibling’s sex composition and gender roles
have on teen pregnancy in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).
Teen pregnancy is still prevalent in Sub Saharan Africa. Adolescent fertility rate is
around 123 live births per 1000 women aged 15-19 years (United Nation, 2009) and
teenage pregnancy rate is over 20% (ICF,2012) in the region. Teenage pregnancy and
early childbearing generate important socioeconomic consequences and can shape and
alter the entire future life of the teen (United Nation, 2009; Panday et al., 2009; Singh
1998; Geronimus and Korenman 1992). The determinants of risky sexual behavior
of teens, and hence teen pregnancy, have not been fully elaborated. The literature on
public health suggests a set of factors that affect (risky) sexual behavior. These factors
are organized around different levels: individual characteristics, group characteristics,
institutional and legal framework. Panday et al. (2009) provide a review of these
factors and discuss how they are interrelated.
Recent papers in economics have shown that birth order of siblings matter for risky
behavior of adolescents. Given background characteristics, later born siblings are
more risk takers than firstborns in terms of consuming tobacco, alcohol, marijuana and
engaging in risky sexual behavior (Ouyang 2004; Argys et al., 2006; Averette et al.,
2011). The main channel through which these effects prevail is parental supervision:
firstborns are closely supervised by their parents as compared to later born and the
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increased level of supervision is associated with lower risk. Averette et al. (2011)
conclude that peer effect prevails beyond the parental supervision as the effect of
older siblings on younger ones persist even after controlling for parental supervision.
This chapter focuses on men’s control over sexuality and reproductive behavior of
women in the above described patriarchal context. Given the majority of SSA soci-
eties are patriarchal, this paper shows how older brothers exercise direct control over
sister’s sexuality and behavior within the household, as compared to other siblings. In
developing societies, older siblings have care-taking roles towards the younger ones
who are often supervised by them for extended periods while parents are away or at
work. Younger siblings are often taught to respect their older siblings and cooperate;
the relationship between them often end up interdependent and hierarchical, with re-
sponsibilities and authorities like that of parents. Brothers exercise direct control over
their sibling’s sexuality and have better comparative advantage as watchdogs towards
bad pretenders because of age distance from younger female teens of the household
and their potential sexual partners. They can easily screen partners and monitor the
behavior of sisters in order to avoid out-of-wedlock pregnancy in the family. This
paper attempts to evaluate this role of male firstborns on risky sexual behavior of teen
sisters.
To my knowledge, this is the first research that looks at how gender inequality shapes
sexuality and reproductive behavior of adult women with long-term consequence on
their well-being. Indeed gender inequality in income, education, health, inheritance
and labor supply have been extensively analyzed in the economics literature. It con-
tributes to the existing literature in two different ways. Firstly, how siblings affect
each other in future economic outcomes and well-being across many dimensions. In
this respect, birth order and gender are found to be important determinants of sibling’s
well-being. Birth order has a role on risky behavior of younger siblings through two
channels: parental supervision and peer effect. This chapter brings forth this liter-
ature by investigating the interaction of birth order and gender on younger sibling’s
behavior. Secondly, there is a growing literature on son preference in SSA, in line
with the analysis of missing women in Asia.29 Different motivations have been put
forth to explain gender bias in fertility preference in SSA, among which patrilineality
of property inheritance and especially that of land. 30 This chapter extends this lit-
29 For missing women in Asia, I refer to the extensive literature on sex ratio and selective abortion
brought forth by different authors like Sen (1990). For sex preference in SSA, I refer to Anderson and
Ray (2010) and Milazzo (2012).
30 There is an extensive literature on how marriage, inheritance and institutions affect women’s well-
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erature by providing further explanation of the “demand for son” among women in
Africa. Male members of the family, and specially older ones, contribute in serving as
watchdogs for younger female siblings for their transition to adulthood. Not only they
reduce direct family-costs from being pregnant, they also create positive externalities
for members of the household by reducing costs associated to premarital pregnan-
cies of sisters. The chapter sheds light on the advantage of sons in strong patriarchal
organizations by shaping sexuality and reproductive behavior of young women.
DHS data for Cameroon, Nigeria and Chad is used to investigate the effect of gender
composition of older siblings on adolescent’s risky sexual behavior in SSA. Indeed,
in SSA context where contraception use is low and abortion is illegal and unsafely
practiced, engaging in risky sexual behavior can be very costly for the teen and the
family. Out-of-wedlock pregnancy and premarital sex among teen girls is undesired
by parents who want to avoid the associated costs. The findings of this chapter sug-
gest that teen girls are less likely to engage in deviating behaviors if born in male
firstborn families where an older brother functions as a watchdog in their transition
to adulthood. They are roughly 2.5 percentage points less likely to have had premar-
ital childbearing with respect to peers in female firstborn families. In relative terms,
this corresponds to almost 50 percent reduction. Survival analysis on age at first birth
also suggests older brothers delay the timing of out-of-wedlock pregnancy giving ev-
idence of teen’s protection in their transition to adulthood. The analysis is widened to
investigate the difference between male firstborns and any male older bother.
The identification strategy is based on a simple “natural experiment” within the house-
hold. Parents decide to have a child but do not choose gender of their firstborn. Thus
gender of the firstborn is exogenous in a household decision making and behavioral
model. Although, exogenous at birth, female teens from male firstborn families might
still systematically differ from those in female firstborn families in older ages if sex of
firstborn affects household characteristics. I estimate the parameters by controlling for
these observables. Overall, comparison of secondborn girls in male firstborn families
vs female firstborn families gives a causal interpretation in SSA context where almost
all families have at least a second child.
Teen pregnancy has everlasting consequences. I also examine these consequences
by analyzing the welfare status of women with out-of-wedlock pregnancy while teen
in older ages. After controlling for several factors, having had premarital teen preg-
nancy among never married is associated with higher probability of being head of
being in SSA. See for example Guyer (1987).
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the household rather than part of a larger family. Among those ever married, having
had a premarital child while teen is associated with lower education of the husband
and higher husband-wife age-gap. A child born out-of-wedlock from a teen mother is
associated with fostering and being dead at the time of the survey.
The chapter starts by drawing a general picture on age based hierarchy and gender
bias among siblings in patriarchal SSA. It discusses teen’s social life and attitudes
of parents towards premarital sex in Section 4.1. In Section 4.2, I describe data and
empirical strategy while results are presented in Section 4.3. I address, in Section
4.4, mechanisms and alternative confounding factors on the role of male brothers as
“watch-dogs”. Finally, Section4.5examines potential welfare consequences of teen
pregnancy and concluding remarks are laid in Section 4.6.
4.1 Age and Gender Based Roles among Teen Siblings in SSA
Context
Texts in anthropology and sociology have shown how age-based hierarchy is widespread
in SSA. Older siblings have responsibilities towards the younger ones which is accom-
panied by some form of authority. For example, Heritier (1981) discuss this factor: «
. . . . Le rapport aîné/cadet, même lorsqu’il s’exerce entre hommes, peut être traduit
en termes de génération, comme s’il s’agissait d’un rapport de père fils et non un
rapports entre frères » ( F Heritier 1981 cited by Abèlès and Collard 1985, p207).
Translated: « ...The relationship between firstborn/younger siblings, even among men
only, can be interpreted in terms of generation, as if the relation is between father/son
and not among brothers ». The author puts emphasis on age based hierarchy and
parenting among siblings in many in patriarchal societies of SSA countries where
other than age, sex also constitutes authority. In fact, in Abèlès et al. (1985): «. . . .
l’ordre sexuel prime : si deux jumeaux de sexes différents naissent et que la fille se
présente la première, on pense que le garçon va mourir parce qu’il ne pourra pas
supporter l’offense; même s’ils sont plus jeunes que leurs sœurs, les garçons sont tou-
jours servis en premier.» (Abèlès et Collard 1985, p208). Translated: “.... gender
based order dominates: if twins of different sexes are born and the daughter comes
out first, it is believed that the boy will die because he cannot bear the insult; even
when they are younger than their sisters, boys are always served first ”. These forms
of hierarchy can also be seen in terms of land inheritence (including livestock): « En
ce qui concerne les animaux, l’aîné reçois trois fois plus que les autres fils aînés des
autres épouses du père. . . » (Abèlès et Collard 1985, p210); “Regarding animals, the
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eldest boy receive three times more than firstborns of the other wives of the father”.
In domestic relations, older siblings endorse protective behavior with responsibilities
towards younger siblings. They often have similar authorities like that of parents. In
Cicirelli (1995), the author underlines that care-giving of siblings serve as a backup
system in the event that parents do not survive up to a certain age. The relationship
is more than just custodial because they are combined with an educative mission to
socialize and train younger siblings to become functioning members of the society. In-
deed, younger siblings are taught to respect and obey older siblings as they would have
to a parent (Cicrelle, 1995). The relationship between brothers and sisters also have
an important role in marriage negotiations as they depend on one another to gener-
ate the wealth necessary for building own families and increasing household’s wealth.
Gender combined with age creates a different form of authority; male firstborns are
the most dominant figures with the greatest seniority among siblings. « . . . dans le
contexte des relations des individus considérés dans leur appartenance à des unités
domestiques, celui qui domines est l’aîné, celui qui est dominé est le cadet. . . . . . . . . .Il
n’y a d’aîné et de cadet que d’hommes ; les femmes apparaissent comme des in-
struments de domination des ainés sur les cadets. » (Marc-Eric Gruénais 1985, pg
221)31. Translating: “ in the context of intra-household relationship, the ruler is the
eldest son, he dominates the younger siblings .......... Elder and younger sibling’s re-
lationship exist only among males; women are seen as instruments of domination by
firstborn”. This implies that gender of the firstborn have important influences in terms
of authority within the household and among siblinings.
Premarital teen pregnancy is undesired by the teen and parents for several reasons and
importantly the associated economic costs: first, opportunity cost from schooling if
the likelihood of attending school after puberty is low ; second: the parenting time
and economic cost of raising the child; third, being forced into early marriage with
partner when possible; fourth: higher difficulties in finding other partners who will
take her and the child in charge and hence end up being fostered or single parent;
fifth: those teens who value the return from education, they might decide to undergo
an abortion which is often illegal and unsafe in developing countries. Last but not
least, adolescent pregnancy is found to be associated with higher rates of morbidity
and mortality for the mother and the child. Other costs which cannot be valued are
those associated with the well-being of the child who is raised without the presence of
31 Marc-Eric Gruénais 1985, « Aînés, aînées ; cadets, cadettes les relations ainés/cadets chez les Mossi
du centre» dans A&C1985)
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both parents.
Contraceptive use in Central Africa is very low and, because the cost of teen pregnancy
is very high, parents and older siblings tend to control premarital sex of their teen girls.
“Parents exercise control over teenagers. The widespread belief is that a teenager’s
bad behavior may damage the families name and reputation. Parents tend to be harder
on girls, always warning them to avoid premarital sex and manners that would cost
them prospective husbands” (Teen life in Africa. Toyin Falola,2004-p4). “Social life
is active as teenagers meet one another to play and share experiences. Not all cultures
encourage dating. Boys have more freedom than girls and tend to socialize more
outside of their homes and with many more people. Parents are always anxious to
know the friends with whom their daughter socializes. In cultures where virginity is
much valued, socialization can lead to premarital sex which is condemned” (Teen life
in Africa. Toyin Falola,2004-p6). As underlined by Falola (2004), parents tend to
exercise direct control over their teen girls and together with older siblings they serve
as “watchdogs” against non desired partners.
Male firstborns have an advantage in protecting younger female siblings from po-
tential bad partners in their transition to adulthood. The main comparative advantage
stems from two characteristics of male firstborns: gender role and age based hierarchy.
Firstly, gender roles allow older brothers to socialize more outside the household and
given networks are gender biased in patriarchal societies, they are likely to be closer
to the network of potential partners as compared to older sisters. Secondly, in African
societies, inter-generational sexual relations has been emphasized in the HIV/AIDS
literature due to transactional sex.32 Birth order allows male firstborns to be closer to
the network of potential partners of younger sisters, as compared to younger brothers.
Male firstborns also have higher authority and status within the household. In fact,
from the domestic violence data-set, the percentage of teens who have been beaten
by a brother are more than twice as those who have ever been beaten by a sister (the
overall percentage is less than 10%). In conclusion, male firstborns are best positioned
in serving as watchdogs for younger siblings.
32 Prevalence of sugar daddies and risk of HIV/AIDS infection has been put in evidence in several
studies. See for example Dupas et al. (2009)
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4.2 Data and Empirical Strategy
Descriptive Statistics
I use the Maternal Mortality section module from the DHS surveys in three different
patriarchal and bordering countries: Cameroon 2004, Nigeria 2005 and Chad 2005.
The DHS is a representative sample of women in childbearing age (15-49) with dif-
ferent marital status. Individuals are asked to list all siblings from their biological
mother, including their age, sex, mortality and number of childbearing. The choice of
these countries is based on territorial comparability and cultural similarities. Indeed,
transition from child-to-adulthood of teen girls, as well as gender roles, is specific to
contexts and place of interview. 33
Age at first birth is mainly concentrated between the age of 15-19, both within and
out-of-wedlock pregnancy. Figure 8 shows the distribution of age at first birth by
type of pregnancy; as expected, marriage delays age at first birth. Nonetheless, teen
pregnancy is predominant in these countries.
Fig. 8: Age at First Birth: Within/Out-of-Wedlock
Table 20 shows descriptive statistics by country and generation. Although slightly
different by country, women who had teen pregnancy are likely to give their first birth
between the age of 16-17 across all cohorts in Panel A. Teens in Chad, endowed with
lower level of schooling, bear a child earlier than their peers in Cameroon and Nigeria
(Panel G). Similar pattern is observed for age at marriage; it is higher in countries with
33 They reflect cultural values that drive marriage and fertility preferences, as well as economic de-
velopment and access to schooling of girls. Education has played an important role in the timing of
reproductive events among teens in Sub-Saharan Africa where access to primary and secondary school
of girls has been increasing with different rates in the last 30 years.
66
higher level of girl’s education. In Cameroon and Nigeria, the percentage of women
who had a child or got married while teen is decreasing across cohorts while years
of schooling is increasing (Panel B, E and G). However, one in two women bear a
child before the age of 19 in Nigeria and it can reach up to 60% in Cameroon and
Chad suggesting that women enter adulthood very early. A slightly different pattern is
observed in Chad where schooling is improving across cohorts but remains relatively
low. In the same line, polygamy is decreasing across cohorts, except in Chad, where
a clear pattern is not found.
Premarital pregnancy is the lowest in Chad where transition from childhood to adult-
hood is relatively shorter decreasing the likelihood of premarital sex. Indeed, more
than 80% of women get married before the age of 19. A good part of teen preg-
nancies occur within marriage but premarital pregnancy while teen remain relatively
high as compared to other SSA countries. Cameroon has the highest rate of premari-
tal pregnancy and with certain degree of stability across generations ranging between
12-16%. It decreases to 5-6% in Nigeria and 1-3% in Chad. Premarital childbear-
ing while teen does not keep these girls out of the marriage market- more than 50%
of them get married before the age of 19. The pattern is similar across cohorts and
countries, though slightly higher in Chad. This might suggest that pregnant teens are
forced into shot-gun marriage. I define shot-gun marriage as women who got married
the same year they got pregnant or the year after. In Panel I, between 9-14% teens
end up in shot-gun marriage with similar and comparable patterns across cohorts and
countries. Estimation of shotgun marriage based on imprecise time-line is likely to be
biased. Women who have been forced into marriage after the birth of the child are not
taken into account.
Fig. 9: Kernel Distribution of Age at First Premarital Birth
Notes: I plot age at first birth of premarital pregnancies for women in male against female firstborns. The
sample includes secondborn women aged between 15-24.
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Figure 9 shows how premarital pregnancy varies by gender of the firstborn. Kernel
distribution of age at first premarital birth shows that women from male firstborn fam-
ilies are likely to delay out-of-wedlock pregnancy while teen. For empirical analysis,
the exogeneity of firstborn’s gender can be interpreted as a causal effect on second-
borns and other confounding factors are unlikely to bias the parameter.
Women of different ranks in male vs female firstborn families are likely to bear sys-
tematic difference over time due to other household decisions: siblings rivalry, fertility
stopping rule, marriage and labor market etc. Indeed, women from male firstborn fam-
ilies seem to be oversampled in Figure 10a. This might suggest that the two groups are
not totally random and are likely to be subject to different environments. From Figure
10a, older women are likely to declare to be born in male firstborn families. The bias
can be attributed to selection on gender of the firstborn affected by parental decision
in fertility behavior models like “the demand for son”.34 Precisely, women from fe-
male firstborns end up with systematic higher number of siblings; they are likely to be
worse-off due to resource scarcity and have lower probability of reaching older ages.
Another explanation for the high percentage of male firstborn families stems from the
fact that women with poor economic conditions have higher biological probability to
give female births.35 This gives further evidence that women from female firstborn
families are generally from poorer socio-economic conditions. This implies a down-
ward bias in the parameter of interest if these women are less likely to be sampled in
a household based survey like that of the DHS or reach older ages.
Retrospective data suffer from data quality and bias related to miss-recalling and/or
miss-reporting. The bias is likely to be correlated with socio-economic characteristics
of individuals. 36 Recalling of birth history (own or that of the mother) suffer from
gender based bias if women tend to recall an older dead brother (male birth) rather
than an older sister (female birth) and specially if death of the sister (child) occurred
in early ages.37 Indeed, women from environments where the “demand for son” is
34 Milazzo (2012) underlines that missing women exist in Nigeria due to social pressure for bearing
sons. Son preference behavior in fertility puts women at risk due to maternal mortality. Indeed, the
author finds that women with female firstbirth are more likely to have higher number of births, desire for
addition children and shorter birth interval.
35 Almond and Mazumder (2011) find a negative correlation between maternal malnutrition and male
childbearing which is inherent to the weakness of male fetuses. The authors use Ramadan and date of
birth to estimate this relationship.
36 For a review on the type of bias related to retrospective data, Beckett et al. (2001) provide evidence
from developing countries.
37 Dyson (2001) provide evidence on miss-reporting of female births from India. Similar findings are
found in China as well.
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dominant tend to be gender biased when reporting birth history. In Figure 10b I plot
the percentage of women from male firstborn families by total number of siblings and
her rank. Given the rank of the woman, the proportion of male firstborns decreases
with the increasing number of siblings. It confirms that male firstborn families are
smaller on average. The figure also suggests that given the total number of siblings,
the further the woman is from the firstborn, the more likely she declares to be from
male firstborn family. In addition, individuals are likely to report a bias if death of
the firstborn occurred in early ages. In Figure 10c I plot the proportion of dead male
firstborns vs dead female firstborns by age at death. The proportion of male firstborns
among those who died before reaching the age of one reaches 65% and gradually
decreases when firstborns died after the age of 10. Recalling of older siblings seems to
be gender biased where gender is negatively correlated with age at death. Women from
poorer socio-economic characteristics are likely to be biased towards male firstborn
families. This would further create a downward bias on the parameter of interest
because women from female firstborn families are likely to be better off .38
38 Recalling bias can also be due to biological weakness of male births who are likely to die before
reaching the age of 1. However, I find that mortality of male births is particular to firstborns. Mean
difference of survival status among siblings, given the firstborns are alive, suggests that women from
male firstborns have lower mortality rate among siblings.
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Fig. 10: Distribution of Male Firstborns
(a) Male Firstborns by Age Group
Notes: I plot percentage of women from Male firstborn
families by Age Group. The sample includes all non first-
born women aged between 15-49 with at least one sibling.
(b) Male Firstborns by Preceding and Total Num of Siblings
Notes: I plot percentage of women from Male firstborn
families by the number of preceding siblings over total
number of siblings. The sample includes all non firstborn
women aged between 15-49 with at least one sibling -.
(c) Dead Firstborns by Sex and Age at Death
Notes: I use the sample of women with dead firstborns and
plot the percentage of male firstborns against age at death.
Again, the sample includes all non firstborn women-with
at least one sibling -aged between 15-49.
(d) Male Firstborns by Education Level
Notes: I plot percentage of women from Male firstborn
families against their Education Level. Again, the sample
includes all non firstborn with at least one sibling -aged
between 15-49.
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All the above figures and discussions suggest that socio-economic conditions are
likely to be correlated with gender of the firstborn among siblings. Indeed, in Fig-
ure 10d education of the women si correlated with gender of the firstborn. Women
with lower level of education are more likely to report being from a family with male
firstborn. Overall, findings suggest selection; socio-economic characteristics of the
women need to be taken into account for the empirical analysis.
In Table 21, I test mean difference on socio-economic characteristics between the two
groups. I further restrict the sample to women with firstborns alive to reduce bias
due to recalling or biological survival of male births. I find that women from male
firstborn families are generally older and worse-off in terms of wealth and years of
education, although not statistically significant if survival of firstborn is not taken
into account. The number of current household members and number of siblings
also seem smaller and statistically significant if firstborn is alive. Overall, women
from male firstborn families live in smaller families and survival of male firstborns is
lower confirming high death rate among male births; interestingly, among firstborns
alive, the number of siblings who died before reaching five is lower if from male
firstborn family and it is statistically significant. This suggests mortality of firstborns
before reaching the age of one is common if male birth and likewise said, mortality of
male births is characteristic to firstborns; it suggests that recalling or miss-reporting
bias based on gender cannot be excluded. Mortality of women is statistically lower
among women in male firstborn families suggesting selection on women from female
firstborn families. This is consistent with the stopping rule theory where women from
female firstborn families are likely to be part of bigger families (albeit not statistically
different) with scarcer resources to share among siblings. I discuss and take into
account these differences in the Empirical Strategy section.
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Tab. 21: Mean Difference by Gender of Firstborn and Survival Status
Variable Obs Obs
Female FB Male FB Diff Pval Female FB Male FB Diff Pval
age 35730 27.5365 27.5563 0.02 28461 27.1223 26.9293 -0.193 *
years of education 35693 5.3818 5.2856 -0.096 28428 5.5625 5.4384 -0.1241 *
head is male 35730 0.8041 0.8107 0.007 28461 0.8024 0.815 0.0126 **
poorer 35730 0.1945 0.2029 0.008 28461 0.187 0.1988 0.0118 **
poorest 35730 0.1866 0.1846 -0.002 28461 0.184 0.1815 -0.0025
middle 35730 0.1951 0.1946 -0.001 28461 0.1927 0.1943 -0.0016
richer 35730 0.2017 0.1996 -0.002 28461 0.2053 0.2024 -0.0029
richest 35730 0.2221 0.2183 -0.004 28461 0.231 0.2229 -0.008
household members 35730 6.7708 6.7347 -0.036 28461 6.6879 6.6658 -0.022
respondent is head 35730 0.0947 0.0946 0 28461 0.0925 0.0886 -0.0039
sons died 35730 0.2595 0.2603 0.001 28461 0.2361 0.2365 -0.0004
dauthers died 35730 0.2304 0.2227 -0.008 28461 0.2131 0.1995 -0.0136 *
total siblings 35730 6.0791 6.0509 -0.028 28461 5.9198 5.8197 -0.1002 ***
siblings's children 35730 1.9173 1.2555 -0.662 *** 28461 0.7689 0.9516 0.1827
first born dead 30442 0.1854 0.2188 -0.026 ***
under five died 30442 0.6994 0.7365 0.0371 ** 28461 0.4951 0.4557 -0.0394 ***
siblings died 35730 1.1481 1.2025 0.0544 *** 28461 0.7852 0.7396 -0.0456 ***
female siblings died 35730 0.632 0.4521 -0.18 *** 28461 0.3364 0.3223 -0.0141
Mean Mean 
Note: Sample consists of all non firstborn women aged between 15-49 with at least one sibling. Standard errors are clustered at the household level. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Empirical Strategy
I take advantage of a quasi-random variation on gender of firstborns to test the role
of older brothers on risky sexual behavior of teens in patriarchal societies. I mea-
sure risky sexual behavior of teens by out-of-wedlock pregnancy given self reported
variables on sexual behavior can be subject to bias. I compute premarital live births
of representative women aged between 15-49 from Central Africa. The identification
strategy lies on the idea that gender of the firstborn among siblings is exogenous to
household characteristics, under the assumption that selective abortion is inaccessible
to these women and almost all women have at least one child.39 In Africa, exogene-
ity of sex of the firstborn is likely to be at birth but, in subsequent years, women
might have followed different patterns in life that can be attributable to gender of
the firstborn in their family. I have discussed some of these patterns and motivations
in the previous paragraph: firstly, “son preference” where women tend to grow with
39 To my knowledge, there is no prenatal sex detection technologies in Sub-Saharan Africa that can
put in cause the validity of the inference like in Asia (Arnold et al., 2002)
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higher number of siblings; secondly: miss-reporting/recalling bias where older and
less educated women tend to declare being from firstborn family; third, the correla-
tion between nutritional status of the mother and sex of the child might further put in
cause the validity of causal inference. Indeed, sex preference induce selection as mor-
tality among women from poorer and female firstborn families is likely to be high;
miss-reporting/recalling bias would also suggest that women with high rank among
siblings (further from the firstborn) are likely to be from male firstborns. Precisely,
women from bigger and poorer socio-economic condition are likely to miss-report
being from male firstborn families. The correlation between nutritional status of the
mother and sex of the child would also imply high mortality among female firstborn
families. In conclusion, women from female firstborn families sampled are likely to
be better off in terms of socio-economic condition inducing a downward bias on the
role of male firstborn families on teen pregnancy. To account for this bias, I control
for the following: general socio economic conditions: regional, age, wealth, religion,
total number of siblings and rank fixed effects. Other controls are education, house-
hold size, age and sex of the head of household and the variables that are statistically
different between the two groups as shown in Table 21.
I first estimate regression of the following form:
yih = α+βmaleih +X ′ihγ+λr + εih (9)
where yih is premarital pregnancy encountered by woman i in household h and re-
gion r, male takes the value one if the teen is born in a household with male firstborn
based on birth history of the biological mother and zero else. In some specifications,
male takes ordinal values that takes into account the number of preceding males. Xih
represent household characteristics and λrare regional dummies. Xih include age dum-
mies, education, age of the head of the household, if female headed household, birth
interval and dummies for income of the household. In a first stage, I restrict the
sample to secondborns in order to avoid selection due to son preference and miss-
recalling/reporting. Conditional on a girl being secondborn, gender of the firstborn
allows a causal interpretation. As gender of the firstborn alter the number of siblings
a woman has, in all regressions I control for dummy that accounts for the total num-
ber of siblings. I use fixed effects for the number of preceding siblings to control for
miss-recalling and son preference of the mother. Those in higher ranks are likely to
be from female firstborn families if the stopping rule applies for the mother. Age and
74
region fixed effects control for all other factors that are specific to cohorts and the
region and are likely to determine family structures and behavior of women. For ease
of interpretation and analysis, I omit families with twin births. Intracluster correlation
within households might alter standard errors, hence all regressions are clustered at
household level.
I further conduct survival analysis to model if the timing of age at first premarital birth
depends on gender of the first born from the mother’s family. To keep it in comparable
terms, I run the cox hazard regression on secondborns. I estimate the following model:
hi(t) = h0(t)exp(β1xi1 + ..+βkxik) (10)
where h0(t) is the baseline hazard at time t and Xik are the covariates or risk factors
that determine premarital pregnancy, including the variable of interest that is male
firstborn families.
If gender roles and age-based hierarchy is typical in Central Africa, one would expect
the parameters on male firstborns to be negative and to increase with the increasing
number of preceding males. It is likely that hierarchy might be based both on gender
and age. If age based hierarchy among siblings is predominant, the role of an older
brother is likely to be different from that of a younger brother in siblings relationships.
Gender of a younger sibling is exogenous to behavioral choices of the mother given
she has conscious decisions over the number of her births; gender of the first child
is likely to shape the behavior of the mother if having an additional child or not.
Conditional on deciding to have another child, sex of the younger sibling is exogenous
to behavioral choices of the mother. I control for socio-economic characteristics that
are likely to differentiate women with a younger brother from those with sisters in
their subsequent life. I substitute gender of the next younger brother in the above
Equation 9. If gender roles matter more in shaping siblings behavior, the coefficient
should be negative and significant as that of the older brother.
4.3 Results
The Effect of Male Firstborn on Out-of-Wedlock Teen Pregnancy
In the sample of teenage girls, more than 97.5% have at least one sibling; this allows
a causal interpretation on the effect of gender of firstborns on secondborn’s behavior.
Table 22 gives OLS estimates of male firstborns on teen pregnancy. The sample refers
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to secondborn teens between the age of 15-19.40 My analysis is based on never mar-
ried women and their pregnancy.41 I first look at the youngest cohort and secondborns
because selection is likely to be minimized in such a sample. Indeed, from Column
(1)-(7) the coefficient on male firstborn is stable over the inclusion of covariates that
takes into account household characteristics. Relative to the average pregnancy rate of
their counterparts in female firstborn, i.e. 0.05, being born in a male firstborn family
reduces out-of-wedlock pregnancy by .025 points. This corresponds to a fifty percent
decrease in relative terms. The stability of the coefficient across all columns suggest
exogeneity of parental characteristics on secondborns.42 From descriptive statistics,
women of older ages and higher ranks are more likely to be from male firstborn fam-
ilies and their characteristic differs across gender of the firstborn. In regressions with
the overall sample, we include household characteristics that take into account this
selection. In Column (5), I include a dummy if the household is female headed; the
presence of the father in the household reduces teen pregnancy like the male first. The
magnitude of the coefficient is similar to that of an older brother.
Survival analysis on the incidence of child birth reveals that having an older brother
accelerates the hazard of out-of-wedlock childbearing. In Figure 11 I plot the hazard
ratio by gender of the firstborn. Male firstborn reduces the incidence of premarital
pregnancy. Table 23 puts magnitude on the previous graph with results from the cox
hazard regression. Being secondborn in male firstborn families reduce the hazard ratio
by 34%.
Results from the above two regressions give evidence of the role older brothers have
in reducing teen pregnancy and the associated costs. This effect is less likely to be
correlated with household characteristics or parental preferences.
40 Results based on a sample of women from 15-24 give very similar and stronger results. As discussed
above, if individuals are subject to miss-recalling/reporting, then sex of firstborns might be correlated
with other characteristics. I focus on girls up-to the age of twenty-four, which are the youngest cohorts
of the sample and potentially more capable of reporting an accurate information on older sibling’s sex
composition.
41 Definition of marriage and average age at first marriage change by region, culture and religion. This
might alter the definition of woman and transition to adulthood. The role of brothers as watchdogs on
sisters not only can prevent premarital pregnancy but also induce gun-shot marriage. I consider the
extreme case where the women never entered marriage. This would create a downward bias as we do
not consider women who had premarital pregnancy and were forced into marriage.
42 The coefficient varies a lot across countries with the biggest magnitude in Cameroon. The coeffi-
cients in Nigeria and Chad are negative but not statistically significant because average teen pregnancy
is very low.
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Fig. 11: Cox Hazard Estimates on Secondborn Women aged between 15-24
Tab. 23: Cox Hazard Estimates on Age at First Birth
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Notes:The sample includes women aged between 15-24 who are secondborns in singleton birth families. The standard
errors are clustered at household level and the coefficients are the proportional hazard ratios. Controls include age,
ever had sexual relation and religion. The regression is based on the pooled data of Cameroon, Nigeria and Chad.
4.4 Mechanisms and Alternative Explanations
The Role of Gender and Birth Order. Older Brothers as “watch-dogs”
Older male siblings, other than firstborns, are likely to have similar effects on pre-
marital pregnancy of younger siblings. As discussed in the descriptive statistics, the
identification strategy for male older siblings might however be put in cause by se-
lection on parental preferences and characteristics. Table 24 shows the impact of pre-
ceding number and proportion of males on teen premarital pregnancy. The first two
columns in Table 24 show that having one additional male preceding brother would
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reduce the likelihood of premarital pregnancy by 1 percentage points. When I control
for socio-economic characteristics, the coefficient increases confirming the downward
bias discussed in the empirical strategy. Alternatively, Column (3) and (4) illustrate
that moving from no preceding male to all males would reduce the propensity to preg-
nancy by 3 percentage points. Both the parameters on the number of preceding males
and its proportion are comparable to the coefficient found on male firstborns in the
above regressions.
There are two theories through which older siblings influence the younger ones: the
role and opportunity model. The role model states that younger siblings tend to imitate
older ones while in the second mechanism, older siblings influence younger ones by
providing opportunities (friends and settings) which might include substance use and
sexual intercourse.43 This paper highlights the second mechanism with the effect
being gender related. Female firstborns can also exercise a direct control over their
younger teens if they communicate about sexuality with each other. This is not the
case in Central Africa and teen girls seem to communicate more with friends rather
than family members about topics related to contraception use. In either case, this
would not affect the conclusion of the study.
In Column (5) and (6) of Table 24, I estimate the impact of gender of the next younger
sibling on premarital pregnancy. Given a teen has a younger sibling, gender of the
next younger sibling can be interpreted as random. Results suggest that premarital
pregnancy is not affected by a sex of younger sibling. This would suggest that age-
based hierarchy predominates over gender roles among siblings. Precisely, age-based
hierarchy interacted with gender is the main channel that drives the above results.44
Columns (7) and (8) of Table 24 show the role of preceding males in female first-
born families. The coefficients on preceding males is not significant suggesting the
importance of male firstborn brothers in influencing risky sexual behavior of younger
sisters and acting as watchdogs in their transition to adulthood. Reporting a citation,
discussed in Section 4.1, it is likely that male firstborns are the most dominant figure
among siblings. In the context of intra-household relationship, the ruler is the eldest
43 Our results might be driven by the role model if women from female firstborn families are likely
to have older sisters with premarital pregnancy. Unfortunately we do not have data on birth history
of siblings to identify any causal inference of older siblings behavior on younger ones. The impact of
preceding males might also be driven by the opportunity model if sister are likely to discuss family
planning and share information.
44 One reason might be age distance between older siblings and potential partners of younger sister.
The smaller the age gap between the brother and partner of the sister, the better it is for the brother to
screen and retrieve information on the quality of partners.
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son, he dominates the younger siblings. Elder and younger sibling’s relationship exist
only among males; women are seen as instruments of domination by firstborn (Marc-
Eric Gruénais, 1985). However, a further explanation would be statistical power as
variability in the dependent variable is very low. Indeed the coefficient remains neg-
ative. Selection on the number of siblings and systematic difference between the two
groups, as discussed in the empirical strategy, might be another reason for the down-
ward bias.
The last two columns evaluate sex composition of preceding siblings on thirdborns.
Third born women with two preceding males are less likely to have premarital preg-
nancy as compared to mixed preceding siblings confirming the above results. Indeed
the magnitude of the coefficient is almost three times the parameter on secondborns.
The role of male firstborn is the most important determinant of premarital pregnancy
as in the previous regressions. This suggests that gender of the firstborn makes the dif-
ference in shaping risky sexual behavior of teens. Preceding males are likely to have
similar effects but endogeneity constrains the causal impact on premarital pregnancy.
Interaction among firstborns and younger siblings: survival status of first-
borns, age distance and presence of male figure in the Household I test
different mechanisms to argue that results support the idea of male brothers as “watch-
dogs” to shape the behavior of younger teens. Precisely, I show that direct interaction
between firstborns and non is necessary to shape premarital pregnancy. For example,
male births are likely to die in early ages and this would imply that mortality of male
firstborns is higher. I test if survival of firstborn is important in capturing the impact
of male firstborns on premarital pregnancy. If it is the case, this would imply that
interaction between siblings is essential in reducing premarital pregnancy. In Table
25, I show coefficients on survival status of the firstborn. Column (1) shows the co-
efficient on male firstborns alive at the time of the survey, or have lived at least until
the age of 20, with a negative and significant coefficient. Alive male firstborn reduces
the likelihood of pregnancy by .018, which is comparable with the above coefficient
on second born teenage girls. Women born in families with male firstborn who died
before the age of 20 are likely to be pregnant out of wedlock. The interaction coeffi-
cient is positive and big in magnitude.45 This is consistent with the idea that survival
45 It might be the case that families with male firstborn who died before the age of 20 are worse-off
and the coefficient might be capturing this economic condition. Nonetheless, these women are doing
worse than women born female firstborns who died before the age of 20. As discussed in the descriptive
statistics, there might be selection on gender of the firstborn and these women might be doing better with
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of firstborns is a determinant element to impact negatively premarital pregnancy and
sexual behavior of younger siblings.
I next test if distance from the firstborn matters for premarital pregnancy. The as-
sumption is that more distance would imply that the firstborn is farther from networks
of the younger siblings and would thus reduce monitoring and supervising. In Ta-
ble 25, I show that distance from firstborns decreases the capacity of supervision and
monitoring. It is intuitive as distance increases the likelihood of siblings to belong to
different networks. Moreover, if distance of the firstborn is too high as compared to
the teen, the likelihood of both siblings to reside in the same household decreases. I
measured distance as the difference between the age of the firstborn and that of the
woman. The coefficient on gender of the firstborn is negative while the interaction
term is positive suggesting that the negative impact of male firstborn on premarital
pregnancy decreases as distance increases. If age distance between the male firstborn
and younger sister is one, the role of “watchdog” by the brother would decrease pre-
marital pregnancy by 3.1% points. If distance between the two is 5 years then the
reduction in premarital pregnancy would be by 2% points reaching almost no effect
if distance is above 15 years. The results confirm that male firstborns who are closer
to networks of younger sisters are more effective in monitoring and supervising their
behavior.
If male firstborns serve as watchdogs, it is presumable to think that male headed fam-
ilies or biological fathers have similar effects on pregnancy of teens. The interaction
based on the presence of both in the household should also presumably further re-
duce premarital pregnancy. In Column (3) of Table 25, I test this last mechanism. The
coefficients on male headed families, male firstborns and their interactions are not sig-
nificant with pvalues around 0.11-0.13. The sample is restricted to women classified
as daughters of the head of household and the variance of the dependent variable is
further reduced. I discuss the parametres assuming that the low pvalue is due to the
reduction in the variability of premarital pregnancy. Women in male headed families
with male firstborn families are likely to avoid premarital pregnancy with magnitude
that is higher than the 2.5 percentage points in the above analysis. This suggests that
the presence of the father in the household further reduces premarital pregnancy.
respect to male firstborn families.
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Tab. 25: Mechanisms and Siblings Interaction on Premarital Pregnancy
Survival Age Distance Male Headed HH
(1) (2) (4)
Male Firstborn -0.0176* -0.0332** 0.0345
(0.00924) (0.0163) (0.0226)
Firstborn died before 20 -0.0171
(0.0230)
Male Firstborn*Firstborn died before 20 0.0618**
(0.0313)
Male Firstborn*Age distance from FB 0.00248*
(0.00148)
Density
Male Firstborn*Density
Male Firstborn*Male headed HH -0.0374
(0.0245)
Male headed HH -0.0414*** -0.0407*** -0.0281
(0.0115) (0.0112) (0.0187)
Age distance from FB 0.00590**
(0.00261)
Age distance from FB^2 -0.000116**
(5.07e-05)
Years of Education -0.0203*** -0.0203*** -0.0129***
(0.00217) (0.00198) (0.00208)
HH Members 0.00695*** 0.00708*** 0.00626***
(0.00146) (0.00135) (0.00162)
Ever used Contraception 0.119*** 0.118*** 0.116***
(0.0150) (0.0143) (0.0181)
Mortality among Siblings 0.00899* 0.0109** 0.0180***
(0.00537) (0.00523) (0.00549)
Constant 0.653** 0.568** -0.121
(0.257) (0.263) (0.0852)
Observations 8,954 8,954 5,730
R-squared 0.217 0.218 0.188
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent Variable is Premarital Pregnance
Notes:OLS estimate of survival status of male firstborns, age distance and presence of the father in the household.
Column(1) shows estimates for male firstborn who had live at least until the age of 20; Column (2) shows how distance
from the firstborn reduces the parameter on male firstborns and finally Column (3) shows how fathers have similar
effects on teen pregnancy. The last column is based on the sample of women classified as daughter of the head of
household. Only non firstborn teenage girls in families of singleton births are included in the sample. Standard errors
are clustered at the household level. All regressions include regional, age, rank. religious, total number of siblings
and income fixed effects. Other controls are are shown in the table.
To sum up, in SSA, age gap between teenage girls and their partners is relatively high
as compared to many industrialized countries. 46 Potential partners of female siblings
are closer in age to older brothers rather than younger ones. This gives comparative
advantage for an older brother as a “watchdog” . The fact that networks are gender
biased, older brothers are more advantaged as compared to older sisters in acquiring
information on pretender’s quality. I give evidence of this mechanism and interaction
among siblings in Table 26. It shows that male firstborns increase age gap between
46 I refer to the extensive literature on inter-generational sex in SSA, emphasized in Dupas (2011).
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the woman and her first husband by almost a year. This effect increases to more than
a year if brother is alive and age gap with firstborn is low. As expected, having a
younger male brother does not affect the characteristics of the partner. It leads to
the conclusion that older sibling’s gender affects age gap between a woman and her
partner at first marriage. Women are likely to choose partners who are older and
outside own network to avoid being caught by watchdogs of the family. These results
are particularly true for women who got married between the age of 15 and 30 in
urban areas.
Tab. 26: The Role of Preceding Males and Age Gap with Partner
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Male Firstborn 0.706* 0.908** 1.067**
(0.409) (0.424) (0.476)
Post Male 0.0588
(0.406)
Firstborn died before 20 0.533
(1.248)
Male Firstborn*Firstborn died before 20 -1.846
(1.489)
Male Firstborn*Age distance from FB -0.105
(0.0778)
Age distance from FB 0.158
(0.135)
Age distance from FB^2 -0.000424
(0.00163)
Male Firstborn*Male headed HH
Years of Education -0.265*** -0.246*** -0.265*** -0.264***
(0.0487) (0.0516) (0.0487) (0.0491)
Male headed HH 0.663 0.617 0.633 0.706
(0.558) (0.591) (0.554) (0.559)
Mortality among Siblings 0.141 0.104 0.196 0.136
(0.260) (0.262) (0.275) (0.260)
Constant 8.887** 10.60*** 8.944** 8.345**
(3.682) (3.691) (3.860) (3.686)
Observations 1,165 1,069 1,165 1,165
R-squared 0.112 0.120 0.114 0.115
Dependent Variable: Age Gap with Partner
First Union and Age at Marriage between 15-30 in Urban Areas
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes:OLS estimate of age gap with first husband or cohabitant of women in union only once. The sample includes
women who got married between the age of 15 and 30 in urban areas. Such a sample excludes forced marriage or
parental arrangements with high population density where women are likely to have several contenders. Only non
firstborn teenage girls in families of singleton births are included in the sample. Standard errors are clustered at the
household level. All regressions include regional, age, rank. religious, total number of siblings and income fixed
effects.
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Other Mechanisms: Differential allocation of parental resources, siblings sex com-
position and resource competition would imply that parents allocate less resources to
teens with an older brother and hence increase the propensity of pregnancy. This
would not affect the main results. One can still assume that parents decide to push
the teen girl with an older brother into marriage. In the data-set, there is no evidence
of an association between gender of an older brother and the probability of being in
marriage while teen nor anticipates the timing of marriage.
In general, inferring on teen pregnancy is challenging due to under-reporting. For-
example Leibowitz et al. (1986) show that teens with greater value of time are less
likely to carry their pregnancy to term, while those who already dropped out of school
are more likely to bear the child. In a survey conducted in Cameroon on 384 adoles-
cents aged between 20-29, being in school increased the likelihood that a pregnancy
ended in abortion more than 7 times. The results found in previous sections might be
capturing the effect of male firstborn on abortion rather than risky behavior. It makes
sense to think that women with an older brother are likely to abort rather than teens
with an older sister. Abortion is illegal and unsafely practiced in the countries un-
der study and if it is the case, mortality of women should be higher in male firstborn
families. This is not the case in the data. If anything else, male firstborns reduce
significantly mortality of younger sisters in older ages as shown in Table 21.
Sex of preceding birth significantly affects birth-weight of successive pregnancies.
After a male birth, the body of the mother is likely to be worn because it is costly
in terms of energy and breast-feeding. One can assume that a teen born after a male
firstborn is physically doing worse than a teen after a female birth; this makes the
latter more active in the matching and marriage market. The results on male firstborn
are not driven by the difference in the Body Mass Index of the teens.
Finally, a leading alternative explanation for the results is the role model, i.e. younger
siblings tend to imitate older siblings. A secondborn with an older sister is more prone
to be pregnant than with an older brother if the sister has been ever pregnant. Older
siblings might introduce the younger ones to deviating behaviors and expose them
early to adult behaviors. Unfortunately, there are no data available on birth history
of siblings to investigate this mechanism. However, the effect might go either way
if pregnancy of an older sister alert parents who put more effort in supervising the
younger ones. Moreover, many studies who addressed this phenomenon suffer from a
drawback on distinguishing between neighborhood or parental effect from that of role
model.
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4.5 Welfare Consequences of Premarital Pregnancy while Teen
From descriptive statistics, a good percentage of women tend to get married before
reaching the age of 19, as shown in Panel F of Table 20. In this section, I run regres-
sions to look at the role of premarital pregnancy when teen on marital status, quality
of marriage and the child’s well-being. Given the average age at first birth is sixteen,
I further distinguish between premarital pregnancy while teen before and after six-
teen47. The excluded categories are those who got pregnant after marriage or never
got pregnant while teen.
Premarital Pregnancy and Marital Status
Table 27 reports results on marital status of women who had premarital teen preg-
nancy, subdivided by age-group. Never married women in their twenties, at the time
of the survey, are associated with being head of the household if they had out-of-
wedlock pregnancy. This holds specially for women who got pregnant before the age
of sixteen. Being head of the household might be costly in a pro-male biased economy,
although difficult to conclude on the overall welfare.
Premarital pregnancy reduces the likelihood of being ever married among older co-
horts and for those pregnant after the age of sixteen. The youngest cohorts, between
the age of 20-29 with out-of-wedlock pregnancy before the age of sixteen, are more
likely to be married. Among those ever married, Panel B shows they are also more
likely to be classified as wife of the head of household. On the reverse, teens pregnant
out-of-wedlock in older cohorts or after the average age of sixteen have different pat-
terns as compared to those pregnant before sixteen in the youngest cohort. As what
concerns age at marriage, as expected, premarital pregnancy delays age at marriage.
The delay in age at marriage of the youngest cohort seems very small as compared to
the older ones, suggesting they enter the marriage market easily.
In conclusion, for the youngest cohorts, age at premarital pregnancy matters for their
marital status in older ages. Those pregnant out-of-wedlock before sixteen are more
likely to enter the marriage market, be classified wife of the head and get married on
average less than one year older compared to their peers without premarital pregnancy.
Those who have premarital child after the age of sixteen are less likely to get married
47 The basic idea behind is to disentangle the role of pregnancy after the age of sixteen, which might
be considered the norm. Among those who had a pregnancy before the age of nineteen, sixty percent of
them were pregnant before the age of sixteen.
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and enter the marriage market much more later than their similar.
For the oldest cohorts, independently from age of pregnancy, they are less likely to
ever get married. Moreover, among those ever married, the delay of age at marriage
is higher as compared to their cohorts.
Premarital Pregnancy and Quality of Partner
Table 28 shows the association between premarital teen pregnancy and partner’s qual-
ity for ever married women. Ever married women in the oldest cohorts seem not to
be affected by premarital pregnancy in terms of age-gap with partner and his years of
education compared to their cohorts without premarital pregnancy. In the same line,
those who had premarital pregnancy after the age of sixteen do not seem to be affected
in terms of partner’s quality. Conversely, teens who get pregnant out-of-wedlock be-
fore the age of sixteen and belong to the cohorts of 20-29 or 30-39 are more likely to
be married with a less educated partner and older one.
In conclusion, for the youngest cohorts, age at premarital pregnancy matters for the
quality of their partner. They are more likely to be married to less educated men with
higher age-gap compared to their cohorts without premarital pregnancy. Older cohorts
and those pregnant after the age of sixteen seem not to be affected by teen premarital
pregnancy in terms of partner’s age and education.
Premarital Pregnancy and the Child’s Well-being
I investigate the survival status and residence of the firstborn child, born out-of-
wedlock, compared to those within wedlock. Table 29 shows different patterns among
different cohorts regarding the residence of the child. Women of older cohorts, aged
between 30-49 and got pregnant out-of-wedlock, are less likely to have their child
living with them as compared to their cohorts who ever gave birth within marriage.
As for the youngest cohort, where age at pregnancy matters for the well-being of the
child, premarital pregnancy before the age of 16 is associated with a negative likeli-
hood of the child living with the mother while the opposite holds for those pregnant
after the age of 16.
Across all cohorts, having a premarital child while teen is associated with the likeli-
hood of the child being dead. These is in line with the literature on the risks of neonatal
87
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morbidity and mortality associated with teen pregnancy48. In fact, the coefficients on
pregnancies before 16 are as twice as those between 17-19.
Concluding remarks on Welfare Consequences of Premarital Pregnancy
In countries where age at first marriage and birth are concentrated during teenage, the
transition from childhood to adulthood is very early making it difficult to differentiate
between premature accidental pregnancy and the norm. To this purpose, the above
analysis is distinguished by pregnancies that occurred below and above the average
age of birth when teen, i.e. 16. A further distinction is made by age groups.
Family structure and marriage characteristics are changing across generations and co-
horts and the results give evidence of this by looking at different cohorts and the
welfare consequences due to teen pregnancy.
Women in their twenties at the time of the survey, the welfare consequences of pre-
marital pregnancy before the age of sixteen is completely different compared to those
who gave birth within marriage or in older ages. They are more likely to end up in
marriage with their child being fostered or dead. Their partners are less educated and
older as compared to partners of their cohorts. On the reverse, if they are never mar-
ried, they tend to be head of the household and live on their own. Overall, having a
premarital child before the age of sixteen seems to be associated with marriage, of bad
type with non-optimal consequences for the child.
For the oldest cohort, having a premarital pregnancy when teen tends to reduce the
likelihood of marriage and delay age at marriage. Nevertheless, the quality of partner
among those married, in terms of age and education does not seem to be significantly
different from their cohorts. Child’s survival and residence have a very similar pattern
across cohorts. Children born from premarital pregnancy are more likely to be fostered
and less likely to be alive at the time of the survey.
4.6 Conclusion
In Central Africa, age at marriage is increasing due to schooling of girls, leading to
the exposure of teens to premarital sex and hence pregnancy. Still, age at first birth
within and out-of-wedlock is concentrated during teen-age with an important impli-
cation on well-being of the girl. This paper studies how preceding sex composition of
48 If I restrict the sample to teens with birth before the age of 16, there is no statistical difference in
terms of survival if within or outside-wedlock
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siblings shape these consequences in strong patriarchal societies. In countries where
age-based hierarchy prevails among siblings and gender role is biased towards males,
the study finds that being born in a family with male firstborn reduces the likelihood
of premarital pregnancy. I used a simple natural experiment on sex of firstborns to
investigate the causal impact of gender, interacted with birth-order, on risky behavior
of women in Central Africa. I find that male firstborns, who are closer to the network
of younger sisters’ pretenders, reduce teen pregnancy by 2.5 percentage points, that
is equivalent to a 50% reduction. Gender alone does not drive this behavior; indeed,
birth order seem to be an important factor that allow older brothers to serve as watch-
dogs for pretenders. Additional preceding males in the household serve as watchdogs
as well. The mechanism is based on direct interaction among siblings and potential
partners. Indeed, distance in age, survival status of the firstborn and presence of the
father in the household are other elements that shape the parameter of interest. Broth-
ers tend to socialize more outside the household as compared to older sisters and this
puts brothers in a better position to be informed and dismiss in advance, as compared
to sisters or younger brothers, siblings’ contenders who are of bad type. The study fur-
ther shows how socio-economic consequences of premarital pregnancy in early ages
is heterogeneous across cohorts and age of birth. The youngest cohorts who get preg-
nant before the age of 16 are likely to have the worst outcome in terms of marriage,
husband’s quality and survival of the child.
I used data from a population based survey at the individual level from Central Africa
to show the role of brothers in patriarchal societies. The study contributes to the
existing literature in two manners. Firstly, it extends the findings on the role of birth
order and sex composition of siblings on risky behavior of the younger ones with
everlasting economic consequences on their well-being. Indeed, previous studies have
found that being a non firstborn increases the likelihood of engaging in risky behavior
like smoking tobacco, marijuana and sexual behavior (see for example Ouyang 2004;
Argys et al., 2006; Averette et al., 2011). This study brings forth the literature by
exploiting gender of the firstborn to estimate a causal effect because birth order alone
is confounded with total number of siblings. An additional originality of this finding
stems from understanding how both birth-order and sex composition of preceding
siblings matter in shaping risky behavior of adolescents in patriarchal contexts.
The study also contributes to the existing literature on son preference of women in
developing countries. Economic outcomes like inheritence are found as driving forces
of the strong preference for sons in developing countries. This study contributes to the
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literature in providing evidence of the role sons have in reducing costs associated to
women’s premarital pregnancy within the household. The rise in age at first marriage
has exposed teens to premarital sex and hence potential out-of-wedlock pregnancy
rendering girls costly.
Although, average premarital childbearing while teen is more or less constant and
comparable across cohorts, there is an increasing number of studies pointing out the
rise in abortion over recent years. Understanding factors that drive or shape these
patterns is essential for addressing future social policies.
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